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Labor, Trade, and Populism: How ILO-WTO Collaboration Can Save the Global
Economic Order
Abstract
Populists are trying to take down the global economic order and its institutions. While some of those
forces might be fueled by racism, they also play to legitimate social concerns that include massive plant
closings and deindustrialization, inadequate skills programs, and lack of decent jobs. Some of these
problems also concern the Global South, as workers there face exploitation, unhealthy working
conditions, and other social ills caused by global capitalism. In light of these problems, this Article argues
that the International Labor Organization (ILO) should design new conventions on lead firm liability and
mass layoffs. While other scholars and policymakers have already argued that lead firms should shoulder
employer responsibilities of their suppliers, contractors, and franchisees, this is the first law review article
that calls for an ILO convention that can diffuse such rules globally.
The Article also calls on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to advise the ILO on these labor-protective
conventions. The WTO, as an expert trade body, can better ensure stakeholders that these new
conventions will comply with international trade law and policy, including with WTO “public morals”
exception rules and with rules on technical barriers on trade and tax and subsidies. In doing so, the WTO
can guarantee that the new conventions, far from hurting trade, will help to enhance the global trade
regime. Moreover, the WTO, through its “peer review” practice, where stakeholders can discuss how to
create and implement new labor and trade policies, can help coordinate a muchneeded global dialogue
for a more inclusive globalization. This is also true of the ILO conventions that we advocate for here.
We conclude by addressing likely arguments against our proposal, including from scholars and
policymakers skeptical of the role that international law can have on the current political turmoil. After
addressing those objections to our proposal, we maintain that collaboration between the ILO and the
WTO, while certainly not the panacea for all the complex and daunting problems of our times, remains
critical to restore legitimacy to the global economic order in a postpopulist era.
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The Article also calls on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to advise the
ILO on these labor-protective conventions. The WTO, as an expert trade body,
can better ensure stakeholders that these new conventions will comply with
international trade law and policy, including with WTO “public morals”
exception rules and with rules on technical barriers on trade and tax and
subsidies. In doing so, the WTO can guarantee that the new conventions, far
from hurting trade, will help to enhance the global trade regime. Moreover, the
WTO, through its “peer review” practice, where stakeholders can discuss how to
create and implement new labor and trade policies, can help coordinate a muchneeded global dialogue for a more inclusive globalization. This is also true of
the ILO conventions that we advocate for here.
We conclude by addressing likely arguments against our proposal, including
from scholars and policymakers skeptical of the role that international law can
have on the current political turmoil. After addressing those objections to our
proposal, we maintain that collaboration between the ILO and the WTO, while
certainly not the panacea for all the complex and daunting problems of our
times, remains critical to restore legitimacy to the global economic order in a postpopulist era.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), have governed the regulation of global trade. While closely
related to trade, international labor regulation has been separately
addressed by the International Labor Organization (ILO) without
much input from the trade agency. This decoupling of labor from
trade seems no longer tenable. We live in a 21st Century economic
reality where national economies are importantly structured by global
value chains (GVCs),1 also referred to as global supply chains,
production networks, and commodity chains,2 that know no allegiance
to one country or deference to a regulatory body, but with social
impacts on a global scale. The 20th Century regulatory structure needs
an urgent update to deal with the pressing issues of the day, where
global markets and social conditions now also appear chaotic and
unraveling.

1. In this Article, we chose to use the term “global value chain” to refer to the
same phenomenon that the International Labor Organization (ILO) defines as
“global supply chains.” Int’l Labour Office, Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, 105th
Session 1 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_468097.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTB3KCZN]. The ILO defines global supply chains as “complex, diverse, fragmented,
dynamic and evolving organizational structures.” Id. The ILO also acknowledges that
“[a] broad range of terms exist to describe [GVCs], including global production
networks, global value chains and global supply chains. All of these terms focus on the
same basic issues of cross-border production and trade, but with slightly different
perspectives.” Id.
2. See, e.g., Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East
Asia, 12 J. ASIAN BUS. 75, 75 (1996) [hereinafter Gereffi, Commodity Chains] (explaining
that the term highlights the overlap in divisions of labor caused by producer-driven
and buyer-driven chains); Gary Gereffi, The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global
Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks, in COMMODITY
CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 95 (Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994).
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GVCs, have revolutionized the way many understand and debate
matters related to the world economy.3 Technological innovations
have enabled certain multinational enterprises (MNEs) known as “lead
firms”4 to organize multi-jurisdictional production and trade networks
via global sourcing and to maximize the benefits of the division of
labor and specialization on a global scale. An increasing number of
goods, ranging from aircrafts to iPhones to T-shirts, are now designed,
sourced, manufactured, and distributed through GVCs.5 GVCs’
contribution to globalization has been unprecedented. But while
corporate profits soar and some developing countries benefit from
new opportunities, Schumpeterian6 disruptions fueled by industrial
relocation from the Global North to the Global South, automation,
and other technological innovations have increasingly threatened
many workers across the globe.7 Formerly vibrant manufacturing
centers in the U.S. Northeast and Midwest have for decades been
3. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO] &
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & ECON. DEV., IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL VALUE
CHAINS FOR TRADE, INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND JOBS 6 (Aug. 6, 2013),
https://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_oecd_wto_2013d1_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3HP-6RM2] (stating that GVCs encompass all types of
economies and have important policy implications).
4. A lead firm is “the company that controls the global supply chain and sets the
parameters with which other firms in the chain must comply, and is typically
responsible for the final sale of the product.” Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 5
(footnote omitted) (citing John Humphrey & Hubert Schmitz, Inter-Firm Relationships
in Global Value Chains: Trends in Chain Governance and Their Policy Implications, 1 INT’L J.
TECH. LEARNING, INNOVATION AND DEV. 258, 258–82 (2008); WILLIAM MILBERG &
DEBORAH WINKLER, OUTSOURCING ECONOMICS: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT (2013)).
5. See WORLD BANK GRP. [WBG], WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2020: TRADING FOR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 104 (2019) (stating that GVCs have
contributed to the global spread of production and after-sales services of goods).
6. Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economist, popularized the now famous
phrase, “creative destruction,” originally from Karl Marx, to describe the constant
process of creation and destruction in capitalist societies, which disrupt old orders to
build new ones. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–83
(Routledge 1976) (1943). Creative destruction was thus a “gale,” a “process of
industrial mutation . . . that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
7. According to a recent survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), although automation will radically transform nearly onethird of global jobs, sixty percent of workers lack even basic computer-related digital
skills. OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2019: THE FUTURE OF WORK 269 (2019);
Steve Johnson, Rise of the Robots Threatens Developing World Workers, FIN. TIMES (May 1,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/502dd174-682f-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056.
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standing idle, making joblessness and unemployment their “new
normal.”8 That new normal now gets compounded by other problems
such as depression, alcoholism, and drug abuse, including of opioids.9
Populations, many white, that are harshly affected by deindustrialization
and its side effects have felt “forgotten” by the political establishment
and unsurprisingly voted for the populist Donald J. Trump.10
By “populism,” and following the lead of political philosopher JanWerner Müller, we refer to a political movement that targets elites
while creating a unitary, undifferentiated conception of “the people,”
with identical interests and aspirations, and which feels legitimately
entitled to dominate in politics.11 Hence, while perhaps anti-elitist,
8. See Ann R. Markusen & Virginia Carlson, Deindustrialization in the American
Midwest: Causes and Responses, in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 29, 29 (Lloyd Rodwin &
Hidehiko Sazanami eds., 1989) (stating that net job shrinkage in the industrial
Midwest was 4.5% in the 1980s).
9. JUSTIN GEST, THE WHITE WORKING CLASS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 23–
24 (2018). The numbers are astounding. In 2017, opioids alone killed over 70,000
Americans. Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are so Staggering.’ Overdose
Deaths Set a Record Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/QU6M-9BUT]. Because of these deaths, overall U.S. life
expectancy has dropped; the crisis has shaved off four months to American lives, on
average. Id. Suicide is also reaching alarming heights in these communities. See Olga
Khazan, Americans Are Dying Even Younger: Drug Overdoses and Suicides Are Causing
American Life Expectancy to Drop, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/11/us-life-expectancy-keeps-falling/576664
[https://perma.cc/EQ6B-P9F9] (noting the CDC’s finding that the suicide rate in
rural counties has increased by fifty-three percent since 1999).
10. Cf. Paul Crisholm, Analysis Finds Geographic Overlap in Opioid Use and Trump
Support in 2016, N.P.R. (June 23, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/06/23/622692550/analysis-finds-geographic-overlap-in-opiod-use-andtrump-support-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/E827-TZ8D] (highlighting research that
suggests a geographic relationship between support for Trump and opioid painkiller
prescriptions).
11. As described by philosopher Jan-Werner Müller, populism is “a particular
moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally
pure and fully unified . . . people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some
other way morally inferior.” JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 3 (2016); see also
Alan Bogg & Mark Freedland, Labour Law in the Age of Populism: Towards Sustainable
Democratic Engagement, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: LABOUR
AGENCY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY? 17 (Julia López López ed., 2019)
(citing JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 3 (2016)). But see Adom Getachew,
Reclaiming Populism, BOS. REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/forum/
adom-getachew-reclaiming-populism (arguing against critics of populism who merely
see “exclusionary anti-pluralism, an unstable anti-institutionalism, and a dictatorial
style of political leadership” because of populists’ “appeal to ‘the people’ . . . a central
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populism hides an authoritarian tendency, trying to homogenize
nations that are necessarily differentiated.12 Populism is, therefore,
anti-pluralistic and undemocratic.13
While racism and a relative loss of status has been a major contributing
factor to the rise of populism among some white Americans and
Europeans, so has been economic discontent.14 European populist
movements, such as the so-called “yellow vests,” have expressed their
frustrations, including with the state of economic affairs, in protests. The
yellow vests, “largely composed of poorly paid wage-earners,”15 shook the
French presidency of Emmanuel Macron, and then overflowed into
Belgium and beyond.16 The movement protested diminishing earnings
and high taxes.17 The straw that broke the camel’s back was a new fuel
tax that President Macron tried to impose. The fuel tax promised to
hit working-class communities the hardest.18 Moreover, the fuel tax was
accompanied by a proposal to repeal the French wealth tax, giving
Macron’s proposal a pro-wealthy orientation.19 The protesters were
greeted with overwhelming popular support, as polls showed that over

element of democratic societies”); BRUCE ACKERMAN, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS:
CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW 8 (2019) (opining populists have used
their charismatic leadership to confer legitimacy to the citizens and institutions of
constitutional democracy); CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM 18 (2018)
(contending populism can be inclusive and democratic while at the same time
reshapes the constituent order ruled by technocratic elites). Here, thus, we limit our
definition of populism to that of Jan-Werner Müller without necessarily closing off
debate about a different type of populism that can foment the type of equitable and
pluralistic policies that we argue for in this Article.
12. Alan Bogg & Mark Freedland, supra note 11, at 17.
13. Id.
14. GEST, supra note 9, at 63–66. But see Joann Wypijewski, The Politics of Insecurity,
103 NEW LEFT REV. 9, 10–11 (2017) (describing that the average Trump supporter
made slightly upwards of $80,000, and thus included both business owners and bluecollar workers, white men who “almost made it, but not quite”).
15. Stathis Kouvelakis, The French Insurgency: Political Economy of the Gilets Jaunes,
116/117 NEW LEFT REV. 75, 75–76 (2019).
16. See Jake Cigainero, Who Are France’s Yellow Vest Protesters, and What Do They Want?,
N.P.R. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-francesyellow-vest-protesters-and-what-do-they-want [https://perma.cc/5S38-26H9] (noting
that the protests are “the biggest political crisis [Macron] has faced so far” and could
affect the remainder of his presidency).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Kouvelakis, supra note 15, at 76; “Yellow Vests”: The Support of the Falling French
(Survey), LE FIGARO, Mar. 20, 2020, https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/gilets-jaunessoutien-en-chute-apres-le-16-mars-sondage-20190320.
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61% of French residents supported the yellow vests’ claims.20 The
movement, adding to the anti-globalism, Euro-skeptic chorus threatening
the global economic order, has targeted European Union institutions.21
A similar base of “white working class” support was crucial to the success
of the U.K.’s “Brexit” movement and the Tories of Boris Johnson.22 At the
time of this writing, other European countries, including Russia,
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Italy have populist governments.23 Darker
global forces hostile to immigrants, and raising the banners of
xenophobia, Islamophobia, and white supremacy, are also posing
substantial threats to the post-World War II order.24
Workers from the Global South have also suffered from the
externalities of globalization, and very specifically from ill-regulated
GVCs. The April 24, 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, arguably the deadliest
factory disaster in modern history, is a case in point. It concerned the
collapse of an eight-story garment factory building in Dhaka,
Bangladesh.25 Inside the building labored thousands of workers making
garments for some of the most visible brands in the world—all GVC lead
firms, such as Benetton, Primark, Matalon, Mango,26 Walmart,27 and
many others. The owners of Rana Plaza had built more floors than
legally permitted over an inadequate structure made with poor-quality
20. Kouvelakis, supra note 15, at 76.
21. Gilbert Reilhac et al., French Police, Yellow Vests Protesters Clash in Strasbourg,
REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2019), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-protests/frenchpolice-yellow-vests-protesters-clash-in-strasbourg-idUKKCN1S30EO.
22. See Fareed Zakaria, What Britain’s Seismic Election Tells Us About 2020, WASH. POST
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/whatbritains-seismic-election-tells-us-about-2020/2019/12/19/3316d5d8-22a9-11ea-86f33b5019d451db_story.html [https://perma.cc/KUP7-HZAJ] (describing how the
British Tories won the 2020 elections by combining a nationalist Brexit platform and
an anti-austerity manifesto, which was in conflict with their conservative legacy since
Thatcher); see also GEST, supra note 9, at 58.
23. Bogg & Freedland, supra note 11, at 16.
24. See Nick Robins-Early, El Paso Was the Latest Target of a Deadly, Global White
Supremacist Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/white-nationalist-el-paso-christchurch-shooting_n_5d488476e4b0ca604e36aba0
[https://perma.cc/ZYC5-J2XM] (describing the global character of white supremacy).
25. Rana Plaza Accident and Its Aftermath, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/
global/topics/geip/WCMS_614394/lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4CGVJRSY].
26. Rebecca Smithers, Benetton Admits Link with Firm in Collapsed Bangladesh Building,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/29/benetton
-link-collapsed-building-bangladesh [https://perma.cc/69PZ-NAW7].
27. Steven Greenhouse, As Firms Line up on Factories, Wal-Mart Plans Solo Effort, N.Y.
TIMES (May 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/six-retailersjoin-bangladesh-factory-pact.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/QXE2-QJL7].
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materials.28 Cracks, a fatal sign of structure failure, appeared in the
building a day before its collapse.29 Workers had protested outside the
building on the day of the accident, claiming the structure was unsafe,
but managers threatened to withhold a month’s pay if they did not
report to work.30 The workers returned to work, literally under protest,
and the building collapsed, killing more than 1,100 people.31 Many
others were injured or maimed.32 The global “race to the bottom” can
thus prove deadly for too many.
And just recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexican
maquiladora workers in Ciudad Juarez, classified as “essential,” went
on strike because they were compelled to work in unsafe conditions,
in part because of pressures by leaders of U.S. industry and the U.S.
government.33 Workers were getting sick with COVID-19.34 Deaths were
mounting.35 A labor activist told the BBC that while Ciudad Juarez,
where the protests occurred, officially reported thirteen COVID-19
deaths, the real number was likely three times that.36 Their factories
were not keeping social distance protocols.37 To underscore the
exploitative context, according to the BBC, some of these workers
barely made $80 a week.38
The U.S. National Association of Manufacturers, which likely houses
many lead firms, asked Mexican President Andrés Manuel López
Obrador to classify these workers as “essential” to compel them to work
and safeguard automobile and aerospace U.S. supply chains.39 These
28. Tansy Hoskins, Reliving the Rana Plaza Factory Collapse: A History of Cities in 50
Buildings, Day 22, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
cities/2015/apr/23/rana-plaza-factory-collapse-history-cities-50-buildings
[https://perma.cc/BZ9D-54A9].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jim Yardley, After Bangladesh Factory Collapse, Bleak Struggle for Survivors, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/world/asia/aftercollapse-bleak-struggle.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/ES7Z-FRDZ].
33. Will Grant, Coronavirus: Mexico Factory Staff Question ‘Essential Work’, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52440202 [https://
perma.cc/QX88-QMSK]; Mark Stevenson, US Pressures Mexico to Reopen Plants Amid
Worker Walkouts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://apnews.com/6b2a7e
ae3be49a1ce6ed03e7b2d9b9f1.
34. Grant, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Stevenson, supra note 33.
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supply chains are hardly as crucial in a pandemic, as would be supply
chains of food, medical supplies, and personal protective equipment.40
The BBC reported that the group’s “controversial call was echoed by the
Trump Administration.”41 As it reported, “[t]he U.S. Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Ellen Lord, said last week that
she had contacted Mexican Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard ‘to ask
for help to reopen international suppliers there.’”42
The aforementioned disruptions that lead firms inflict on some
regions of the world, including workers in the Global North and in the
Global South, have been widespread and systemic.43 GVCs have touted
unprecedented wealth to some44 but inflicted disproportionate damage
on others.45 In this way, global economic governance appears “empirically
invalid,” i.e., incapable of effectively harmonizing the demands of
contemporary economy and society.46 Unfortunately, this mismatch
between the global economy and its regulatory structures is increasingly
translating into an emerging crisis of legitimacy, where some sectors of
the world population do not recognize the authentic value of
international trade and its critical role in maintaining global peace,
prosperity, and development.
Some global business leaders have taken note of these challenges
and are trying to respond.47 For example, in a recent meeting of the
Business Roundtable, chief executives of many of the world’s largest
firms declared that companies needed to refocus on their customers,
employees, suppliers, and communities, as well as on the long-term
value of their shareholders. The declaration broke with more than

40. Grant, supra note 33.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 11 (stating how GVCs “are increasingly
multi-directional, and include South–South, South–North and North–North flows”).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1.
46. Sociologist Max Weber used the term “empirical validity” to refer to the
“effectiveness of [law] as a determinant of the real behavior of agents (or actors).”
Michel Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and Max Weber in Mind: The Current Crisis and the
Future of Labor Law, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 605, 613 (2013).
47. See Geoffrey Kabaservice, Joe Biden Is the Ultimate Centrist Democrat. Is that a
Liability or Strength?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/apr/25/joe-biden-2020-democrats-choice
[https://perma.cc/6QS6-LTC8] (noting that American congresswoman Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez has proposed to raise taxes on the wealthy to seventy percent).
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forty years of corporate dogma based on a much narrower, short-term,
shareholder emphasis.48
But while the Business Roundtable’s discovery of society beyond the
shareholder is laudable, the reality of GVCs should make us skeptical
of any attempts to marry social and economic concerns at the company
level.49 That’s because generic, individual companies are not the main
agents of globalization. Globalization, its good and bad, is closely tied
to the decisions and actions of lead firms that head GVCs; lead firms
are particular types of firms with superior authority of the global
economy.50 We could blame the owners of Rana Plaza for the 2013
accident, but they are all but the only responsible parties. The lead
firms who connected their supply chains to Bangladesh are also to
blame. We can also blame governments, such as President Macron’s, for
workers’ diminishing earnings in France, but he’s not the only culprit.
Workers’ deteriorating conditions in France have been slow-moving
train wrecks with multiple causes, including loss of manufacturing jobs
through automation and a lack of skills programs for workers.51 In

48. David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top
C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/
business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7XXVK3V]. But see What Companies Are for, ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.
economist.com/leaders/2019/08/22/what-companies-are-for [https://perma.cc/43
XJ-L4PX] (warning that such “collective capitalism” might lead to the decline of
market competition and long-term prosperity of a society).
49. This Article uses the term “embeddedness” to mean, as understood by Karl
Polanyi, the manner in which economic activity is constrained by social considerations.
See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 482 (1985); Karl Polanyi, The Economistic Fallacy, 1 REV. 9, 17 (1977).
50. See Gary Gereffi, A Global Value Chain Perspective on Industrial Policy and
Development in Emerging Markets, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 433, 438–39 (2014) (stating
that lead firms are typically global manufacturers, retailers, or marketers).
51. Didier Fassin & Anne-Claire Defossez, An Improbable Movement? Macron’s France
and the Rise of the Gilets Jaunes, 115 NEW LEFT REV. 77, 79 (2019) (noting that “since the
2008 financial crisis, the income of the bottom 40 percent of the population has
dropped. Pauperization has mainly afflicted those who were already the most
disadvantaged, among whom joblessness and under-employment became increasingly
rife”); France’s New Labour Problem—Skills Shortages, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/03/08/frances-new-labour-problemskills-shortages; Buttonwood, The Manufacturing Jobs Delusion, ECONOMIST (Jan. 4,
2017), https://www.economist.com/buttonwoods-notebook/2017/01/04/the-manu
facturing-jobs-delusion [https://perma.cc/7YLG-M6RJ] (discussing that France has
lost thirty-three percent of its manufacturing employment between 1993 and 2014); see also
Liz Alderman, Self-Checkout in France Sets off Battle over a Day of Rest, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26/business/self-checkout-automation.html
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Europe, as in the United States, lead firms have for decades relocated
their supply chains to Eastern Europe, the U.S. non-union South,
Mexico, Asia, and other locations where wages are much lower.52 We
could also blame maquiladora owners in Mexico, or even the Mexican
government, for not properly policing health and safety rules, especially
in a pandemic. However, lead firm pressures also share an important
part of the blame for the COVID-19 infections in Mexico and the
resulting strikes and demonstrations by maquiladora workers.
A.

The Argument

Against the background of global economic inequalities and the
populist backlash, now exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, this
Article argues that international organizations, as agents of the
international economic order, must contribute to a post-populist era
sensitive to social concerns while remaining inclusive of the various
stakeholders of the global economy.53 It specifically calls for the ILO
and the WTO, which hold the relevant authority and expertise to
regulate global labor and trade, respectively, to craft global norms for
GVCs. Following the lead of economist and former head of the Wage
and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor under President
Barack Obama, David Weil, who has argued for placing liability on lead

[https://perma.cc/3FKF-CZLS] (discussing French workers’ outrage over automated
checkout machines and their implications for the traditional Sunday day of rest).
52. See WTO & INST. OF DEVELOPING ECON.-JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., TRADE
PATTERNS AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN EAST ASIA: FROM TRADE IN GOODS TO TRADE IN
TASKS 83 (2011) (noting that Asia has contributed to the production chains of Western
economies); Oskar Zieba, How Manufacturing in Eastern Europe Can Benefit Your Business,
ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/ article/322616
[https://perma.cc/7J4C-G3FP] (stating that European fashion brands moved their
production to Eastern Europe to take advantage of the cheaper workforce).
53. In a recent issue of the journal International Organizations Law Review,
professors Franz Christian Ebert and Tonia Novitz underscore that the ILO is no
longer the sole international organization concerned with the world of work. Franz
Christian Ebert & Tonia Novitz, Introduction: International Institutions, Public Governance
and Future Regulation of Work, 17 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2020). They further note
that these organizations might not always complement each other, and at times might
even conflict. Id. at 2, 5. The volume does not, however, directly advocate for interagency collaboration, although it does insist on further studies about inter-agency
relationships. Id. at 5 (citing Henner Gött, Interactions Between International
Organizations: Approaching a Neglected Governance Dimension, 17 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 75
(2020)). While covering an array of international organizations, it does not cover the
WTO.
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firms as employers of contractors, franchisees, and suppliers,54 we argue
that the ILO should adopt a new convention on lead firm liability. Lead
firms that exert control over their contractors, franchisees, and suppliers
to affect the terms and conditions of employment should share
employer responsibilities. Lead firm employer responsibilities would
help better guarantee terms and conditions of employment that meet
international labor standards and the national standards in the
countries where the contractors, franchisees, and suppliers operate.
For example, lead firm employer responsibility can better guarantee
that the employees of said contractors, franchisees, and suppliers will
be paid in accordance with wage and hour laws of the country they are
located in, will have their rights to join unions respected, and will not
face discriminatory treatment. Lead firms can also be held liable in
case of industrial accidents such as Rana Plaza, and thus would be
compelled to ensure that their contractors, franchisees, and suppliers
follow health and safety rules. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions,
including Israel, the Netherlands, and various U.S. states—as well as
the U.S. Department of Labor under President Barack Obama—have
embraced the principle of lead firm liability.55
Second, we argue that the ILO should a enact a new convention on
mass layoffs where employers, including lead firms, assume some of
the social costs of full or partial plant closings through what have been
called “social plans.”56 Many countries impose liabilities on firms that
partially or fully close operations. Lead firms would have to shoulder
the responsibility for the employees of their suppliers, contractors, and
franchisees. These social plans could help workers and their communities
to retool and re-link themselves to other GVCs once lead firms decide to

54. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 190 (2014) (asking if lead firms should
be able to benefit from subcontracting, franchising, and supply chains without
accepting responsibility for them).
55. See The IGLP Law & Global Production Working Group, The Role of Law in
Global Value Chains: A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 57, 76 (2016); Mark
Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of
Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 37
(2013) (proposing to expand lead firms’ liabilities on labor law violations to suppliers
and subcontractors over their GVCs beyond lead firms’ domestic jurisdictions). On
President Barack Obama’s Department of Labor policy on joint employment, which
arguably aimed to reach to lead firms, see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV.,
ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2016-1, JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION
ACT (Jan. 20, 2016) (David Weil issuing Administrator), at 3.
56. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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exit their communities. However, because only a few countries currently
provide for such social plans, we also argue that the ILO should adopt a
convention on mass layoffs so that lead firms can shoulder these
obligations.
Third, this paper argues that the WTO should advise the ILO when
it produces its new conventions on lead firm liability and mass layoffs.
The WTO can provide legitimacy, legal and otherwise, to the ILO’s
lead firm liability convention by declaring how the conventions meet
the public morals exception, Article XX(a), of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and rules on technical barriers on
trade.57 Second, the WTO can provide the ILO with advice on how to
craft a regulatory scheme for lead firms that considers trade impacts.
While the ILO’s tripartite structure provides employer input that can
help create a more balanced convention on lead firm liability, technical
assistance from the WTO’s trade experts can better guarantee that such
conventions will still be consistent with international trade principles.58
Moreover, the WTO can also help the ILO ground its conventions in
WTO guidelines for taxes and subsidies. Social plans will require revenue
raising, and hence, levying additional taxes or providing subsidies for lead
firms. The WTO can help establish ways to provide for such fiscal
measures to protect workers without slipping into protectionism.
Finally, we argue that the WTO can facilitate a post-populist trade
regime through its informal “peer review” space, where it can bring
trade and labor policymakers and stakeholders to meet, discuss, and
develop normative products. It is here where our proposal importantly
diverges from populism, which is characterized by anti-elitism and antipluralistic politics.59 While we are sensitive to the social concerns
fueling populist movements, we vehemently oppose populism’s antipluralistic politics and disdain for expertise. In our view, the ILO’s
tripartite structure, where employers, workers, and governments coproduce normative products, coupled with the expanded space that
peer review might lend to other stakeholders to collaborate, better

57. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Article XX permits
signatory countries to adopt or enforce trade measures “necessary to protect public
morals.” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
58. See generally The UN’s Structures Built in 1945 Are Not Fit for 2020, Let Alone Beyond
It, ECONOMIST (June 20, 2020), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/06/
20/the-uns-structures-built-in-1945-are-not-fit-for-2020-let-alone-beyond-it (arguing that
global problems can be more effectively solved through collaboration between international
organizations).
59. Bogg & Freedland, supra note 11, at 17.
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guarantees a system where a broader variety of actors can participate
in and contribute to an inclusive, global norm-making process.
We recognize that too much WTO influence on the ILO could result
in meaningless conventions where economic and trade matters reign
over social concerns. However, we also caution against a convention
that does not consider trade impacts. At the end, ILO conventions
produced in collaboration with the WTO will be as useful as the quality
of their collaboration turns out to be. If both embattled international
organizations want to remain legitimate and relevant in a post-populist
era, true cooperation will be as necessary.60
B.

Organization of this Article

This Article unfolds in the following sequence. Part I demonstrates
the governance gap existing between two ideals, i.e., free trade and labor
protection, within the GVC context. It first describes how a territorial trap
continues to limit the global economic order, particularly economic and
social governance and regulation. It then explicates how the global
economic order is further mired by structural and historical tensions
between trade and labor, contributing to what the paper calls “entropic
antimony,” or a regulatory conflict that has generated disorder and
instability, rather than order and constancy. Entropic antimony seems
to contribute to the rise of populism and the current delegitimating
trend of the global economic order.
Part II describes how, despite the double governance gap, the ILO
and the WTO have started a series of modest collaborative projects,
that demonstrate two main points: that trade and labor are de facto
tied, despite their de jure separation, as well as the fact that what these
two international organizations are currently doing is still seriously
lacking to craft a post-populist economic order.
Part III argues that these collaborative projects should be encouraged
and deepened. It specifically advocates for new ILO conventions on lead
firm liability and mass layoffs drawn with some advice and support from
60. See It’s the End of the World Trade Organisation as We Know It and America Feels Fine,
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
28,
2019),
https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/2019/11/28/its-the-end-of-the-world-trade-organisation-as-we-know-it
[https://perma.cc/3RS7-Q7DE] (describing the current crisis of the WTO); Simon
Bradley, Has the Global Labour Organisation Advanced Workers’ Rights?, SWI (Jan. 22,
2019), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/decent-work-centenary-has-global-labour-organ
isation-advanced-workers--rights-/44688686 [https://perma.cc/82CE-EP3J]; Claire La
Hovary, The ILO’s Employers’ Group and the Right to Strike, 22 TRANSFER 401, 401–04
(2016) (describing a walkout by the entire employer delegation to the International
Labor Conference, marking a time of crisis at the ILO).
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the WTO. WTO advice and support, if done in good faith and not with
the intent of watering down the ILO’s social concerns, can better
guarantee that the new ILO conventions comport with Article XX of
GATT and overall international trade policy, adding legitimacy to the
project. The WTO can also offer its peer review space to bring together
labor and trade policymakers and stakeholders to discuss the ILO’s
new normative products on lead firm liability and mass layoffs.
Finally, the Conclusion addresses skeptics of the role that international
law—typically soft, politically dependent, and greatly ignored in some
quarters, including in the United States—can have over highly charged
political problems. It also addresses those who might argue that any
ILO-WTO collaboration would simply lead to a watering down of
international labor standards in favor of business, i.e., to reinforce
rather than to change the status quo. After addressing those objections
to our proposal, we close by stating that collaboration between the ILO
and the WTO, while certainly not a complete solution to the complex
and daunting problems of our times, remains critical to restoring
legitimacy to the global economic order and ushering in a postpopulist era.
I. THE DOUBLE GOVERNANCE GAP
This Part describes the double governance gap between GVCs and
their ossified regulatory structure. It is a double gap because while
GVCs are global, regulatory structures remain mostly national.61
Moreover, while GVCs are networks that coordinate global trade and,
for such ends, incorporate millions of workers around the world, the
global economic order has remained stubbornly steadfast in keeping
global labor and trade regulated by the ILO and the WTO respectively—
distinct international organizations with formal, de jure separations.62
This Part foreshadows our main argument discussed in Part III which
proposes that the ILO and the WTO collaborate to contribute to a new
global economic order where lead firms shoulder a heavier load of
social concerns.
A.

The Territoriality Gap

We live in a world economy that is shaped by transnational lead firms
that structure GVCs. We define GVCs in the same vein as the ILO;
hence, by GVCs we refer to:
61. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
62. WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(96)/DEC/ 1, 2 ¶ 4 (1996).
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[T]he cross-border organization of the activities required to
produce goods or services and bring them to consumers through
inputs and various phases of development, production and delivery.
This definition includes foreign direct investment (FDI) by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in wholly owned subsidiaries or in
joint ventures in which the MNE has direct responsibility for the
employment relationship. It also includes the increasingly
predominant model of international sourcing where the
engagement of lead firms is defined by the terms and conditions of
contractual or sometimes tacit arrangements with their suppliers
and subcontracted firms for specific goods, inputs and services.63

As the main architect of GVCs, lead firms design, produce, and
distribute commodities and services around the world. They are
transnational actors that span various nation-states.64 GVCs are networks
of hundreds or even thousands of firms across the globe tied through
seller-buyer relationships.65 Lead firms search for and link producers
and suppliers of goods and services in particular arrangements that
maximize value.66 Researchers and policymakers characterize such
organization of GVCs by lead firms as “corporate governance,” i.e., “the
ways in which corporate power can actively shape the distribution of
profits and risk in an industry and the actors who exercise such power
through their activities.”67
Lead firms and GVCs have created economic opportunities for
many.68 Ordinary workers have found new opportunities through GVC
investments. In fact, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa), large nation-states considered to be “emerging,” are
fast becoming important nodes in GVCs, so much that experts have

63. See Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that GVCs are
characterized by their cross-border nature and the connections that develop).
64. See Roger Cotterrell, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 500,
501 (2012) (noting that the concept of “transnational” is vague, but includes the extranational while also superseding ideas of “international” still mired on the nation-state
as building blocks).
65. Kevin B. Sobel-Read et al., Recalibrating Contract Law: Choses in Action, Global
Value Chains, and the Enforcement of Obligations Outside of Privity, 93 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3
(2018).
66. See Gereffi, supra note 50, at 440–41 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 440.
68. See Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 2, 8, 17–19 (explaining how GVCs
provided employment opportunities to historically disadvantaged groups in developing
economies, including women and migrant workers).
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stated the world has now entered a new “inflection point” where
emerging economies co-lead in world governance.69
Importantly, however, the availability of GVC-created opportunities
has been uneven.70 On the one hand, GVCs have generated new
opportunities for some, with countries such as China benefiting
tremendously from GVCs, followed by other large emerging countries
and an array of developed countries.71 Countries with larger populations
leverage their economies of scale to specialize in niche productive
markets or to compel suppliers to set up manufacturing in their
territories to serve their consumers.72 Sociologist Gary Gereffi posits
that the emerging economies that have best been able to take
advantage of these GVC-created opportunities are those that have
reinstituted industrial policies focusing on “trade promotion, local
content rules, taxes, tariffs, and more indirect programs that drive local
production.”73 These policies form a programs package that the
literature labels as “economic upgrading.”74 Economic upgrading is the
flip side of corporate governance.75 It is “the process by which economic
actors—nations, firms, and workers—move from low-value to relatively
high-value activities in [GVCs].”76 Countries that can better create and
establish those policies to better insert their private economic actors
into GVCs become winners in the brave new world of GVCs.
On the other hand, firms and workers in countries that cannot
upgrade lose.77 We also add that firms and workers in subnational
regions, such as the U.S. Midwest, that are also unable to upgrade, also
lose out even if upgrading in other subnational locations in their
countries is taking place.78 In this sense, countries and regions that

69. Gereffi, supra note 50, at 444 (arguing that this “inflection point” is a new phase
of the global economy that may have dramatic implications for firms and workers
worldwide).
70. Id. at 451–52.
71. Id. at 444 (emerging countries benefitting from GVCs include Russia, India,
Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea).
72. Id. at 448–49, 451–52.
73. Id. at 437–38.
74. Id. at 440–41.
75. Id. at 440.
76. Gary Gereffi, The Global Economy: Organization, Governance, and Development, in
THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 160, 171 (N.J. Smelser & R. Swedberg eds.,
2d ed. 2005).
77. Gereffi, supra note 50, at 454–55.
78. Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 20–21 (noting how workers in developed
economies have lost from GVC decisions to relocate work to the Global South);
Markusen & Carlson, supra note 8, at 29.
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cannot institute effective upgrading policies must make do with “lowvalue added activities [that] can lock firms and national industries into
unprofitable and intellectually narrow segments of the value chain”79—
if on anything at all.
Given that there are winners and losers created by GVCs, some
policymakers are searching for ways to regulate GVCs so that they can
produce more equitable results for the world’s populations.80 However,
most upgrading policies are national in scope, while GVCs operate
transnationally.81 Thus, GVCs remain formally regulated by ineffective
national norms82 or by international ones where the nation-state still
remains the cornerstone in implementing and enforcing them.83 This
gap between regulatory needs and realities, in light of the winners and
losers that GVCs create between states but also within states, sabotages
global governance.84 The growing gap induces some populations,
regions, and even nations, to perceive global regulation as unfair (in
that global regulation militates against their own interests).85 Others
see it as inept (in that global regulation fails to manage growing
interdependency). Either way, the territorial trap signals a problem of
empirical validity and of legitimacy in the global governance regime.
B.

The Labor and Trade Divide

Nation-state centrism, its ideology and apparatus, which spurs a
territorial trap, is not the only phenomenon that prevents a global
economic order from meeting its contemporary challenges. Formal
(de jure) separation of trade and labor regulation is also a central
obstacle towards effective global economic governance. While the global
economic order has declared them to be separate, trade and labor are
necessarily (de facto) linked to each other. The WTO has declared that
the ILO, not the WTO, is “the competent body to set and deal with
79. Gereffi, supra note 50, at 455.
80. See id. at 454 (noting that GVC-driven development creates a host of new
economic and social policy challenges including gaps in health care and education).
81. Id. at 455.
82. See KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIES (1995) (observing that nation states created too many rigid rules captured
by domestic special interests that are incapable of addressing contemporary global
regulatory challenges).
83. See id.
84. Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 2, 39.
85. See GEST, supra note 9, at 35 (describing how white working class people in
formerly industrial cities in the United States and beyond express nostalgia and
bitterness against corporations that abandoned their city, governments that did not stop
them, and immigrant arrivals that changed the complexion of their communities).
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[internationally recognized core labour] standards.”86 Formal linkages
between these two agencies barely exist, barring nominal interactions
between their two Secretariats.87
Things were not always this way. The Havana Charter, the original
version of the International Trade Organization (ITO) launched in
the 1940s, and eventually aborted, provided an ambitious chapter
titled “Employment and Economic Activity.”88 This chapter stipulated
that avoiding unemployment, and underemployment, is “a necessary
condition for the expansion of international trade.”89 ITO members also
recognized that “unfair labor conditions, particularly in production for
export, create difficulties in international trade and, accordingly, each
Member agrees to take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible
to eliminate such conditions within its territory.”90
However, since the official demise of the Havana Charter, trade and
labor concerns in the international arena have been in tension. Many
labor rights advocates fear that an unbridled free trade regime
undermines labor protection by encouraging a “race to the bottom.”91
They highlight the inherent pro-trade bias of the WTO under which an
extremely narrow set of exceptions under Article XX of GATT could not
adequately address social concerns, such as labor protection.92 They
warn that such regulatory failure would delegitimize the entire WTO
system and thus make it unsustainable in the long run.93 In this regard,
some scholars maintain that domestic regulators should be given a
broad scope of regulatory autonomy in combating societal evils—even
if that would compromise free trade.94 Some propose that importing
nations adopt trade restrictions and curb the “race-to-the-bottom”
86. WTO, supra note 62, at 2 ¶ 4.
87. Id.
88. DEP’T OF STATE, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF ITO CHARTER (1950),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/martin/17_07_nd1.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See C.W., Racing to the Bottom, ECONOMIST (Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.
economist.com/free-exchange/2013/11/27/racing-to-the-bottom [https://perma.cc
/GPS2-ZPHP] (explaining that to compete in a global economy, countries not only
reduce labor protections but also restrict labor law enforcement).
92. Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the
Entropic Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 641 (2005).
93. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 660 (1996).
See generally Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 WORLD
TRADE REV. 7, 19 (2002).
94. Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory
Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 5,
28 (1998).
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phenomenon.95 In contrast, free trade advocates warn that trade
restrictions might unduly regulate the labor market to the detriment
of the general welfare96 and criticize that too much emphasis on labor
protection arms protectionists with their preferred excuses.97 Many
economists also fear that linkage between trade and labor law would
deliver neither free trade nor harmonized labor protection.98
One could thus contend that some sectors have configured trade and
labor in a zero-sum way. A pro-trade position is prone to dis-embed social
concerns from economic ones, as already documented by the economic
historian Karl Polanyi.99 They appear to be guilty of the “economistic
fallacy,” which attempts to separate the economic sphere from the social
sphere.100
II. ATTEMPTS OF COUPLING LABOR AND TRADE SINCE THE SINGAPORE
DECLARATION OF 1996
Despite the formal and artificial organizational line-drawing in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s, as discussed above, the ILO and the
WTO have not lived in total isolation from each other. They have been
maintaining a relationship, albeit, admittedly, a very limited one. In
general, the WTO Secretariat “maintains technical exchanges with the
[ILO] with a view to helping members’ global economic policies.
Activities range from compiling statistics, research and technical
assistance and training.”101 According to the WTO:
The WTO Secretariat attends sessions of the ILO Governing Body as
observer and also routinely participates in [certain] meetings . . . At
different times, WTO participation has been at head-of-agency
level . . . Further collaboration has occurred in the context of work

95. See JEFFREY FRANKEL, THE HARVARD PROJECT ON INT’L CLIMATE AGREEMENTS,
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GLOBAL TRADE POLICY, 2–4 (Oct. 2008),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Frankel2Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MR9C-7N3V] (discussing WTO-consistent import restrictions to
tackle climate change).
96. See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in
2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 21, 36 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,
1996).
97. Jagdish Bhagwati, Introduction to 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 1, 5 (Jagdish
N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
98. Raj Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 11, 17–19 (1998).
99. Polanyi, supra note 49, at 16–18.
100. Id.
101. The WTO and International Labour Organization, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_ilo_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/6XTQ-QMUN].
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undertaken between 2002–2004 by the World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalization . . . .
As well, the WTO Secretariat participates in follow-up mechanisms
to the World Commission, including attendance at meetings of the
ILO’s Policy Coherence Initiative. In the last few years, the WTO
Secretariat has on several occasions also attended conferences and
seminars organized by the ILO, when issues of relevance to the WTO
were discussed.102

In a burgeoning interagency collaboration, the ILO and the WTO
have produced three joint reports: one summarizing the literature in
employment and trade, another on trade and informality, and a third
on skills development and trade. This sub-section summarizes those
reports and draws lessons from them for prospective collaboration to
regulate lead firms.
We can observe an evolution of ideas throughout these three joint
reports. The first report (the “2007 Report”) problematizes the formal
separation of labor and trade policy and identifies a coherent connection
between these two issues.103 Then, the second report (the “2009 Report”)
emphasizes the need for policy coordination between the ILO and the
WTO as it describes various challenges brought by informal labor.104 After
the identification of labor-trade linkage and the need for policy
coordination, the third report (the “2017 Report”) finally spells out a
blueprint in the area of skills upgrading.105
A.

The 2007 Report

In 2007, the WTO Secretariat and the International Labor Office of
the ILO published their first joint report. Titled, Trade and Employment:
Challenges for Policy Research (“First Report”),106 it summarizes the social
science literature describing the relationship between trade and labor
markets.107 More specifically, it dives into the literature on social
protection as vehicles for better transitions toward trade liberalization.108
It also describes findings on policies that impact trade, and that can also

102. Id.
103. See infra Part II.A.
104. See infra Part II.B.
105. See infra Part II.C.
106. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE & WTO, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: CHALLENGES FOR POLICY
RESEARCH (2007) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
107. Id. at v.
108. Id. at 59–60.
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be impacted by trade, including active labor market policies,109 freedom
of association and collective bargaining, the informal economy in
developing countries, redistribution policies, and education policies,
among others.110 While observing that relationships between trade
labor markets were not clear,111 the report concludes that trade and
labor policies do interact and that one can affect the other.112 It calls
on policy makers to work toward greater trade and labor policy
coherence.113 In other words, the First Report highlights the de facto
linkage between trade and labor, despite their de jure separation in
the global economic order.
B.

The 2009 Report

The second report, Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing
Countries (“Second Report”), was published in 2009 and focused on the
relationship between the informal labor market and trade liberalization.114
The report aims to combine the expertise of the ILO and the WTO to
describe and prescribe policy ideas to national governments on how to craft
trade and labor market formalization policies so that countries can better
benefit from globalization.115 Providing such policy ideas is particularly
important for developing countries given that most economic opportunities
in those countries are informal.116 In many developing economies, most
job creation takes place in the informal economy, where around sixty
percent of workers labor.117 However, and herein lies the problem, the
informal economy tends to provide less job security to workers, lower
incomes, less access to social benefits, and fewer possibilities to
participate in education and training programs.118 Hence, if increased

109. “Active labor market policies” refer to government policies aiming to actively
help workers find jobs. See Marc Tucker, Industrial Policy and National Success: The
Human Element, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 58 (1993). They contrast with passive labor
market policies, or programs where government merely provide unemployment
benefits with the hope that the workers can find a job on their own. Id.
110. FIRST REPORT, supra note 106, at 61–80.
111. Id. at 85–86.
112. Id. at 90.
113. Id.
114. See INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO] & WTO, GLOBALIZATION AND INFORMAL JOBS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT] (analyzing the
connections between globalization and the informal labor economy in developing
countries).
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 9.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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trade is to truly benefit developing countries, policies must tackle the
problem of informality, which might worsen with increased trade.
While there is no simple or linear relationship between trade and
informality, trade generally increases informality in developing
contexts because developing countries lack the capacity to compete
globally other than by lowering their own costs.119 Firms and workers
thus try to escape costly regulations in light of increased competition
by seeking refuge in the informal sector, where they can offer cheaper
goods and services.120 However, informality also brings with it a slew of
long-term problems that entangle firms, workers, and countries in
poverty traps.121 For example, evidence shows that workers who labor
too long in the informal sector face constricted opportunities to move
to the formal sector.122 Chances to transition to more formal economic
activities decline with the duration of informal work.123 Other evidence
shows that informality contributes to smaller firm sizes, reduced
growth, and smaller productivity increases.124 Long-term productivity
stagnation keeps unprofitable firms in the informal market and
prevents “the necessary churning that is essential for technological
advancement.”125
To resolve the challenges posed by informality and trade liberalization,
the Second Report argues that states should develop policies for firms,
and separate ones for workers.126 For firms, it argues that states must
increase benefits and lower the costs of formality.127 This can be done
by reducing red tape, lowering taxes (in particular for start-ups and
small companies), and supporting firms’ access to capital markets.128
For workers, states should work on upgrading skills.129 Countries can
improve worker skills by providing support to transition out of
informality, investing in infrastructure so as to promote productivity of
informal firms—thus facilitating formalization—and create a basic

119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. at 65–66.
121. Id. at 91–93.
122. Id. at 93 (citing B. Saha & S. Sarkar, Schooling, Informal Experience, and Formal
Sector Earnings: A Study of Indian Workers, 3 REV. DEV. ECON. 187 (1999)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 99 (citing WILLIAM W. LEWIS, THE POWER OF PRODUCTIVITY: WEALTH,
POVERTY, AND THE THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY (2004)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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network of social protection for those who continue to be employed
informally.130
The Second Report also notes that informal workers and firms
sometimes self-organize and provide members and beneficiaries with
social benefits, such as through workers’ associations.131 Sometimes,
these self-organized groups also run their own private insurance
schemes.132 The Second Report argues that governments should support
these self-help insurance schemes by providing the necessary collateral,
without actually running the insurance schemes themselves.133 More
generally, the report argues that local initiatives should be used as
multipliers to help implement policies in the informal economy, thereby
improving efficiencies.134
Perhaps attached to the idea of supporting self-organized groups
and the global economic order’s important goal to protect freedom of
association, the Second Report also argues that governments should
promote “social dialogue”135 between employers and workers for
successful formalization strategies.136 Finally, the Second Report argues
that trade liberalization should be implemented in measured steps and
not suddenly.137 Based on prior experiences, states should be afforded
time to extend trade liberalization rules, something that the WTO rules
already permit to mitigate short-run adjustment costs.138 Moreover, the

130. Id.
131. Id. at 18, 139–40. For example, the report highlights the work of the SelfEmployed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India. Id. at 140 (internal citations
omitted).
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. “Social dialogue” is defined by the ILO as: “[A]ll types of negotiation,
consultation or simply exchange of information between, or among, representatives
of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to
economic and social policy.” ILO, Social Dialogue, https://www.ilo. org/ifpdial/areasof-work/social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm)%20%20a
[https://perma.cc/XJ6GD44W]. “It can exist as a tripartite process, with the government as an official party to
the dialogue or it may consist of bipartite relations only between labour and
management (or trade unions and employers’ organizations), with or without indirect
government involvement.” Id. “The main goal of social dialogue itself is to promote
consensus building and democratic involvement among the main stakeholders in the
world of work.” Id. “Successful social dialogue structures and processes have the potential
to resolve important economic and social issues, encourage good governance, advance
social and industrial peace and stability and boost economic progress.” Id.
136. SECOND REPORT, supra note 114, at 18, 139.
137. Id. at 18, 141.
138. Id.
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Second Report stresses the WTO’s commitment to support the ILO’s
core labor standards,139 or international labor standards that are
applicable to all member states of the ILO.140 These core labor standards
are, to wit, freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced or compulsory
labor, the abolition of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination
in respect of employment and occupation.141 Such commitment,
however, is not followed by any ideas on how the WTO should create
normative products to support said rights.142 It then states the more
recognized policy that the WTO recognizes the ILO as “the competent
body to set and deal with these standards.”143
As in the First Report, the Second Report also calls for active labor
market policies.144 Governments should run employment offices that help
to match workers with open positions in their respective territories.145 This
becomes ever more important with liberalization and the structural shifts,
i.e., Schumpeterian dislocations146, that it necessarily creates. But most
importantly, the report calls for coordination of trade and labor market
policies.147 It concludes by stating that close collaboration between
ministries can foster further information exchange and be used to
establish, and subsequently refine, a broad reform agenda.148 Hence,
the reader can conclude that international organizations should provide
coherent support for policy reform, as well as technical assistance in
designing, implementing, and coordinating these welfare-enhancing
reforms. In all, collaboration across agencies at the international level
seems warranted to spur policy coherence.149

139. Id. at 144–45.
140. ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/4UBMN7ZZ].
141. Id. at 4.
142. SECOND REPORT, supra note 114, at 144.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 145.
145. Id.
146. SCHUMPETER, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
147. SECOND REPORT, supra note 114, at 146.
148. Id. at 147.
149. Shortly after the release of the Second Report, the ILO and the WTO
published an edited volume titled MAKING GLOBALIZATION SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE,
comprised of contributions from academic researchers. ILO & WTO, MAKING
GLOBALIZATION SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE 19 (Marc Bacchetta & Marion Jansen eds.,
2011).
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The 2017 Report

In 2017, the WTO and the ILO published a third report titled,
Investing in Skills for Inclusive Trade (“Third Report”).150 As the title
suggests, it focuses on trade and workers’ skills. It presents evidence,
some original, showing that trade increases technological upgrading
and, therefore, increases demand for skilled workers.151 Countries that
can better meet that demand for skills end up better performing when
trade is liberalized.152 But as the Second Report also demonstrates, trade
does not guarantee better outcomes for workers, or “decent work.”153
Governments need to develop policies to better succeed in a globalized
world and successfully participate in the global economy.154 The report
observes that “investment in skills complements these opportunities to
promote decent work, enabling increases in productivity, providing the
skills needed for modern forms of [Human Resource Management] and
work organization to be effective, and as itself being a component of
decent work.”155
As in the other reports, the Third Report calls for social dialogue156
and active labor market policies157 to craft skill development policies that
sustain decent work. Further, it calls for the whole array of stakeholders
to participate in the policy scheme. As the report states:
Relevant ministries, regulatory agencies, research centres, industry
organizations, professional organizations, supply-chain integrators,
major purchasers and specialist providers of training and advice
such as farm extension services may collaborate on developing and
implementing strategies to raise skills and performance in supply150. ILO & WTO, INVESTING IN SKILLS FOR INCLUSIVE TRADE (2017) [hereinafter
THIRD REPORT].
151. Id. at 11.
152. See id. at 11, 20 (explaining the complex relationship between the production
of goods and services, technological advances, and the demand for skilled workers).
153. Id. at 74. The ILO defines “decent work” as:
[T]he aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves
opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security
in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for
personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express
their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives
and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.
ILO,
Decent
Work,
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang-en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4GV-JX7S]. Decent work has become a major
global goal pursued by United Nations and various organs. Id.
154. THIRD REPORT, supra note 150, at 74.
155. Id. at 160.
156. Id. at 24, 163–64.
157. Id. at 128, 165.
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chain [Micro-, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises], including
small agricultural enterprises where appropriate. The purpose is
both to improve the effectiveness with which they connect to
international markets and to make access to skills development
more inclusive.158

D.

Evaluation

One can draw important takeaways from these reports. First, the
reports show a continued commitment to ILO and WTO collaboration
despite the formal separation of these regulatory areas of the global
economic order. In fact, the Second Report even gives an interesting,
if not revisionist, interpretation of the Singapore Declaration, stating
that the WTO had pronounced its commitment to international labor
standards and supported the ILO. Rather than framing the issue as one
where the WTO washed its hands of labor issues, as is commonly
understood, it underscores WTO commitment to labor standards.
Second, the reports acknowledge the persistent importance of social
dialogue, an ILO staple, to provide policy coherence and support both
trade and labor at a global level, and at the level of nation states. Third,
the reports acknowledge the importance of crafting better markets
through conscientious policy, not through laissez faire. Tied to this
point, trade liberalization should be introduced slowly, not abruptly—
not through shock therapy, as some policymakers argued for in the
1990s.159 In all, the reports call for further braiding of labor and trade
policies and institutions, despite formal pronouncements against
doing so since Singapore and beyond, or at least as Singapore has been
generally understood.
However, there are also many limits inherent in these three reports.
First, neither report really calls for the new normative products—ILO
Conventions or WTO treaties—that combine trade and labor.160 Second,
none of the reports consider in any meaningful way the realities of GVCs.
While GVCs are mentioned in a few occasions, the reports still focus

158. Id. at 167.
159. See Jeffrey Sachs, Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years, TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 267, 267 (Apr. 6–7, 1994), at https://tannerlectures.
utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/sachs95.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8DK-B9HQ] (urging
a rapid transition from communism to capitalism in Western European post-Communist
governments).
160. Even the ILO fell short on calling for new normative ILO products, such as
new ILO conventions, when it has directly tackled the issue of GVCs. See Int’l Labour
Office, supra note 1, at 65–68 (calling for a multiplicity of ILO-led programs except a
new convention to regulate GVCs).
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on the needs of states, workers, and entrepreneurs, but do not consider
the role that GVCs play. Below we provide some ideas to start such a
new normative project to regulate GVCs and greet a post-populist era
sensitive to the social concerns fueling populism but rejecting its antipluralistic and isolationist characteristics.
III. TOWARDS A POST-POPULIST ORDER
The ILO’s General Assembly has the authority, as granted to it by its
members, to adopt conventions and recommendations for member
state ratification that aim to affect the “conditions of labour.”161 To this
date, it has not adopted conventions or recommendations on lead firm
liability or mass layoffs, nor has it made any calls for such normative
products, even when specifically addressing GVC governance gaps.162
In the much awaited International Labor Office report to the ILO’s
International Labor Conference of 2016, the labor office called for an
array of policies to regulate GVCs but not a new ILO convention or
recommendation.163 Here we argue that the ILO must be much bolder
and adopt at least two conventions to deal with the pressing problems
created by unregulated GVCs: one imposing employer liability on lead
firms whose activities impact the terms and conditions of employment
of its supplier, contractor, and franchisee employees, and another one
on mass layoffs. In Section B of this Part we also argue and explain how
the WTO should provide an advisory role on how these two conventions
should regulate GVCs, as they might have significant impacts on
trade.164 Indeed, in its 2006 Report, the ILO envisioned that it may
need to collaborate with other international organizations, such as the
WTO, in developing new normative products.165 We argue that the
WTO can provide advice on how the conventions can protect workers
and enhance trade relationships. The WTO can advise on how Article
XX of GATT may support the new ILO conventions, and how the

161. ILO, Constitution, Preamble, (Apr. 1, 1919), https://www.ilo.
org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:62:0::NO::P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:24539
07 [https://perma.cc/2VF4-ZX5F].
162. Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 65–68.
163. Id.
164. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the ILO should adopt a convention to guide
its members in regulating lead firms and holding lead firms liable for violations of core
labor standards).
165. ILO, Resolution Concerning Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, (adopted on Jun.
10,
2016),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm
/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_497555.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UA3F6ZU].
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conventions conform with rules related to technical barriers on trade.
It can also lend its “peer review” process to the ILO and its stakeholders,
as well as the larger labor and trade policymaking community, to
develop a space for dialogue and norm-making where labor and trade
no longer meet as rivals but as partners in a project for a new,
embedded, global economy. The peer review mechanism is an informal
space that member countries of the WTO use to resolve disputes and
persuade each other of their positions, or even develop new trade
practices and norms.166 In all, ILO and WTO collaboration should
braid labor and trade rules.
A.

Re-Embedding the World Economy

In his magnum opus, The Great Transformation, economic historian Karl
Polanyi introduced a thesis of “double movement,”167 where the market
dis-embeds economic activities from social values, only to be thereafter reembedded as society applies pressure for change. If one applies double
movement view to GVCs, a hitherto neoliberal, deregulatory agenda
represents the first prong (dis-embedding), while the labor-trade linkage
thesis proposed by this Article embodies the second prong (reembedding).168
Re-embedding the world economy begins with embracing a new
paradigm for GVCs. The conventional view of a GVC is economistic, as it
considers GVCs profit-creating structures comprised of firms transacting
efficiently and focused on core competencies.169 That view prevails in
most business schools, for example.170 In contrast, the GVC paradigm
proposed in this Article is a collective project constituted by a dense
web of relationships between and among different actors, with lead
firms at their helm, coordinating activities, followed by others, e.g.,
producers, distributors, consumers, and workers.
The conventional view is increasingly seen as incapable of addressing
social problems left behind by GVCs. Business leaders have taken note.
In a symbolic approach, the Business Roundtable announced a

166. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
167. Fred Block, Introduction to KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, xxviii (Beacon Press 1957).
168. Some scholars approach this “re-embedding” process from a “moral” standpoint.
See Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Moral Views of Market Society, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 14.1,
14.2 (2007) (viewing a market as a “moralized” or “moralizing” entity).
169. See Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
170. WEIL, supra note 54, at 49–52 (describing the business school perspective on
GVCs based on contemporary firm theories focused on “core competencies”).
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“Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution”
stating that:
The purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared
and sustained value creation. In creating such value, a company
serves not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders—employees,
customers, suppliers, local communities and society at large . . .
A company . . . strives for continuous improvements in working
conditions and employee well-being . . .
A company is more than an economic unit generating wealth. It
fulfils human and societal aspirations as part of the broader social
system. Performance must be measured not only on the return to
shareholders, but also on how it achieves its environmental, social
and good governance objectives.171

But will the business sector, and, specifically, lead firms, cooperate
in this global norm-making process, which may eventually increase their
costs of production and operation? Indeed, similar entrepreneurial
attempts to embrace various social concerns, ranging from workers’
health and safety to environmental protection, have been legion under
different labels, such as the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),
Codes of Conduct, and the Global Compact.172 Social scientists and
others have shown that voluntary attempts have largely failed to protect
workers.173 Some observers warn that such voluntary efforts are merely
of a corporate public relations strategy, which dramatically lowers the

171. Klaus Schwab, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution, WORLD ECON. F., (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.weforum.
org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-inthe-fourth-industrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/5XRD-D9ZQ].
172. GAY SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 42–44 (2007).
173. See id. at 3 (explaining that voluntary codes are unreliable, especially when
executives are not committed to compliance); see also Matthew Amengual & Sarosh
Kuruvilla, Editorial Essay: Introduction to a Special Issue on Improving Private Regulation of
Labor in Global Supply Chains: Theory and Evidence, 79 ILR REV. 809, 810 (2020) (noting
that there is a consensus in the literature that “private regulation as practiced is an
inadequate solution to the regulatory challenge in global supply chains”); Frederick
Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of
Private Governance, 12 BUS. & POL. 11, 18–20 (2010) (divulging the limits of private
governance and calling for public intervention); Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through
Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM.
J. COMP. L. 711, 743–44 (2009) (pointing out that “legal transplants through private
contracting” may be less transparent and efficient than legislative or judicial legal
transplants).
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threshold of meeting sustainability, and leads to the phenomenon
known as “social washing.”174
In this regard, some governments hosting lead firms have shifted
from a soft “name and shame” approach to a hard “binding due
diligence” model.175 In the latter model, lead firms may be legally
responsible for violating certain core labor standards and corporate
governance principles across their supply chains, covering suppliers
and subcontractors.176 Indeed, leading European countries have
already passed domestic statutes in accordance with this new hard law
model. For example, France enacted the “Duty of Vigilance Law” in
2017 that requires large French lead firms to publish and execute an
observation plan under which those firms detect and prevent human
rights risks related to their supply chain operation.177 This law applies
to a French lead firm and its subcontractors or suppliers with whom
the lead firm has an established commercial relationship.178 The law
aims to encourage multilateral lead firms to actively monitor any
human rights violations within their GVCs, in France or abroad.179
A much less dirigiste jurisdiction, the United Kingdom, also enacted
the Modern Slavery Act of 2015180 requiring “companies with annual
revenue above £36 million to report on their efforts to combat human

174. See, e.g., Sarah Gordon, Impact Investing Is About More than Saving the World, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019) https://www.ft.com/content/85fb1340-0aa8-11ea-8fb7-8fcec0c
3b0f9 [https://perma.cc/C25N-UJXY] (describing “social washing” as “calling an
investment an impact investment when it really is not” because of the label’s marketing
appeal); see also SEIDMAN, supra note 172, at 133 (describing how CSR without publicly
enforceable sanctions is ineffective); Alwyn Lim and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Globalization and
Commitment in Corporate Social Responsibility: Cross-National Analyses of Institutional and
Political-Economy Effects, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 69, 83–87 (2012) (finding without NGO
pressure in developing countries, there is only short-term adherence to CSR policies
when trade relationships are at stake).
175. See WBG, supra note 5, at 202.
176. Id.
177. Loi 2017–399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés
mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the
Duty of Vigilance of Parent Companies and Ordering Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017.
178. Id.
179. Stéphane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, Revue Internationale de la Compliance et de
l’Éthique des Affaires [A Closer Look at the Penalties Faced by Companies], 50 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE LA COMPLIANCE ET DE L’ÉTHIQUE DES AFFAIRES [INT’L REV. COMPLIANCE
& BUS. ETHICS] (2017), http://www.bhrinlaw.org/frenchcorporateduty law_articles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MGH-K6MN].
180. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
/2015/30/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/N755-4W4Z].
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trafficking in their supply chains.”181 Additionally, at least one U.S. state
has imposed human rights reporting requirements on lead firms,
California. Its Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2012182 mandates
“retailers and manufacturers doing business in California who have
annual worldwide gross receipts of US$100 million or more to disclose
their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking, and to protect
basic human rights, along the entire supply chain.”183
Against this background, re-embedding the world economy
necessitates a closer interagency collaboration between the ILO and the
WTO. While the ILO and the WTO have been officially (de jure) decoupled from each other since the late 1990s,184 both organizations have
recently de facto re-coupled, at least somewhat, as they co-published the
aforementioned joint reports in areas in which labor and trade issues
are linked. Nonetheless, the depth of their collaboration, while
incrementally enhanced since early 2000s, has still not reached the
point of co-producing any normative product. This deficiency in the
interagency collaboration appears to be even more striking considering
the absence of effective international norms to regulate lead firms. In
this regard, this Article calls for both organizations to bolster their
efforts in global norm-making on lead firms. The ILO should work on
new conventions on lead firm liability and mass layoffs and, as we argue
in Part III.D below, do so with the advice of the WTO.
B.

ILO Convention on Lead Firm Liability

In 2006, the ILO adopted Recommendation 198 on the
Employment Relationship,185 where it attempted to tackle the problem
of workers who, while in theory should be protected by labor laws, are not
because national laws are unclear as to who is covered by them, leaving
many workers at the mercy of the market.186 The Recommendation also
shows concern that employers might use contractual strategies to deny
workers their rights.187 In other words, the Recommendation attempts
to tackle the problem of worker misclassification, which could result in
181. Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 42.
182. Cal. Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, Civ. Code § 1714.43 (West
2012).
183. Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 42.
184. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 62.
185. ILO, Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198) (June 15, 2006),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:
12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312535 [https://perma.cc/V35Y-N7X3].
186. Id. at Preamble.
187. Id.
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denying workers’ rights. It thus called, inter alia, for national laws to
provide ample ways to determine employment relationships188 and
presumptions in favor of an employment relationship.189
However, the Recommendation stopped short of clarifying who the
employer might be, or how to determine employer status. As Professor
Jeremias Prassl has argued, most national legal systems—and we should
add, international standards—fail to conceptualize who the employer is,
as they focus on employee status.190 But in today’s “fissured”191 work
relationships, where lead firms subcontract, franchise, and manage
supply chains, identifying and defining who is the employer, and
assessing liability, is more salient than ever.192 International standards
should clarify who the employer is.
For Professor Prassl, the employer needs to be understood functionally
and not contractually.193 In other words, any individual or entity, or a
combination of them, who take on employer functions, to wit,
commencement and termination of the contact of employment, receiving
labor and it fruits, providing work and pay, managing the enterpriseinternal market, and managing the enterprise-external market, should be
treated as an employer.194 In this fashion, it is possible for employees to
have more than one employer, as various individuals and entities may
be assuming essential employer functions over a certain group of
workers.195
U.S. common law clearly recognizes the possibility of employees
having more than one employer through the joint employer doctrine.196
Joint employers are employers who codirect the work of specific
employees.197 U.S. labor and employment laws, since they vary, have
188. Id. at Art. 11(a).
189. Id. at Art. 11(b).
190. JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER 4 (2015).
191. WEIL, supra note 54, at 7.
192. See id. at 189–90 (explaining the relationship between vicarious liability,
liability imposed upon one employer due to actions of its subordinates, and the
contradictory incentives employers have to shift their vicarious liability onto
subcontractors).
193. PRASSL, supra note 190, at 6 (defining the employer as “an entity or
combination of entities, playing a decisive role in the exercise of relational employing
functions, and regulated or controlled as such in each particular domain of
employment law”).
194. Colin Fenwick, The Concept of the Employer, by Jeremias Prassl, 155 INT’L LAB. REV.
163, 164–65 (2016) (book review).
195. See id. at 165.
196. SERGIO GAMONAL C. & CÉSAR F. ROSADO MARZÁN, PRINCIPLED LABOR LAW: U.S.
LABOR LAW THROUGH A LATIN AMERICAN METHOD 85–86 (2019).
197. Id.
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different tests of joint employer status. Under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), for example, a joint employer is any entity or
individual who controls the work of an employee, or that has a
“reserved right to control” the employee, or that indirectly controls the
terms and conditions of employment of an employee.198 On the other
hand, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), an employer is an
individual or entity who “suffer[s] or permit[s]” any person to work.199
A joint employer is any individual or entity who shares employer roles
with another employer in relation to one particular employee.200 While
the tests differ given how each law conceptualizes employer status, a
common thread ties all of these tests: once employer status is
determined under the specificities of each law, more than one
employer could be found if those employers share employer duties for
the same employee or group of employees.
Other jurisdictions also provide for rules to determine something
like joint employer status. In France, the law can uncover employment
relationships that might hide under the cover of a contractual
relationship, especially in triangular relationships where lead firms
hire contractors who, in turn, hire workers who labor at or for the lead
firm.201 As Professors Jean-Emmanuel Ray and Jacques Rojot have
explained, French legal institutions, acting under the principle of
reality,202 will determine an employment relationship with any entity or
individual if the putative employee is subordinated to that entity or

198. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1199–1200 (D.C.
Cir. 2018). In Browning-Ferris Industries, the D.C. Circuit underscored that joint employers
must exercise control or retain the right to control those “matters governing the essential
terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 1209 (internal citations omitted).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018) (to employ “includes to suffer or permit to work”).
Under the FLSA, an employer “includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d). An “‘employee’
means any individual employed by an employer.” Id. § 203(e)(1).
200. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a)(1)(i)–(iv), (e)(2)(i)–(iii) (2020) (mandating that joint
employers “must aggregate the [employee’s] hours worked . . . if there is an
arrangement . . . to share the employee’s services; [o]ne employer is acting directly
or indirectly in the interest of the other employer . . . ; or [t]hey share control of the
employee”).
201. See Jean-Emmanuel Ray & Jacques Rojot, The Fissured Workplace in France, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 163, 168–69 (2015) (describing how courts investigate the
employee-employer relationship to determine if contract recategorization should
occur).
202. Cf. GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 196, at 64 (recognizing the same principle
in Latin America as the principle of “primacy of reality”).
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individual, despite contracts stating the contrary.203 Courts will reform
such contracts to better fit the subordinated reality, transforming them
into contracts of employment, which would compel those individuals
or entities to assume all employment-related obligations under the
law.204 Indeed, Professors Ray and Rojot reported that French courts have
ordered such contract reformations, including in cases of franchising.205
Those employer obligations might include obligations regarding health
and safety and wage-based social contributions, among others.206
In Latin America, Uruguayan labor courts have developed a similar
concept. There, joint employers are recognized as “complex employer[s].”207
Recognizing the obvious, that lead firms determine the terms and
conditions of employment of many workers of their suppliers,
contractors, and franchisees, lead firms have also started to undertake
certain responsibilities in monitoring the health and safety standards
through CSR initiatives.208 After the Rana Plaza accident, for example,
global labor unions, NGOs, and other groups pressured lead firms to
agree to a legally binding commitment where the lead firms placed
health and safety requirements and monitoring obligations on their
contractors in Bangladesh.209 The program that it instituted, while
robust, will end in 2021.210 The parties agreed to transition the
program to national authorities, under some supervision of the ILO.211

203. Ray & Rojot, supra note 201, at 168–69. Judges determine subordination by
evaluating key factual issues, such as:
[D]oes the employee receive instructions? Is he submitted to control in carrying
them out? Is he included a [sic] in an organized segment of the enterprise? Is
he required to conform to a specific work schedule? Does he have to work in a
specific assigned place? Does he work with equipment provided by the
enterprise?
Id. at 169.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 168.
206. Id. at 170.
207. GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 196, at 35.
208. See Mateo Tonello, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jun. 26, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2011/06/26/the-business-case-for-corporate-social-responsibility
[https://perma.cc/B8DR-Q9KR] (encouraging businesses to consider CSR practices
because it can benefit the bottom-line and society at large).
209. Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 1, 1–3 (2013), https://admin.
bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BLY8-XJ2H].
210. Id. at 1.
211. Id.
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The importance of CSR initiatives, including the important Rana
Plaza agreement, is that it provides further evidence for the need to
have lead firms assume certain social responsibilities, particularly over
the work processes and decisions of their suppliers, contractors, and
franchisees, which they effectively control.
Given the need for lead firms to assume greater employment
responsibilities, we argue that it is high time the ILO adopted a
convention to guide its members in regulating lead firms as employers
when they control the work of the employees of their suppliers,
contractors, and franchisees, not only in their national territories, but
also globally. Although the ILO has recognized that lead firms exert
control over their suppliers, contractors, and franchisees, while skirting
employment liabilities, it has fallen short of calling for a convention to
tackle this clear, new reality in the world of work.212 In situations where
lead firms are deemed co- or joint employers, they should be held
liable for violations of core labor standards within their sphere of
control in GVCs, such as violations of freedom of association rights,
discriminatory practices at work, and child labor.
C.

ILO Convention on Mass Layoffs

Extending lead firm liability through international labor standards
would help workers embedded in GVC-related firms receive their pay
under national laws, deter health and safety hazards, better guarantee
their rights to join unions, respect their rights against discrimination,
and otherwise work in conditions sanctioned by international labor
standards. But how would lead firm liability resolve the problem of
restructurings, capital flight, and dislocations that have spurred the socalled “forgotten man” problem?213 One possibility is that by extending
lead firm liability to undertake certain employment-related obligations
under national laws, lead firms will have to co-produce “social plans”
with their suppliers, contractors, and franchisees to help transition
workers during restructurings and plant closings.214 Social plans are
generally understood to be schemes agreed to by firms, local governments,
and worker representatives to help laid-off workers transition to new

212. Int’l Labour Office, supra note 1, at 1–2, 5–6 , 8, 11–12, 17, 21, 29, 39, 42, 48–
49, 51, 53, 58; see also id. at 65–68 (listing ideas for further policy development lacking
any mention of a new ILO convention on GVCs).
213. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
214. See Clyde Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative Study
of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1995) (discussing
German social plans).
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employment.215 This is not unprecedented. Some European countries
have already imposed such duties on employers, and therefore, lead
firm liability would mean that lead firms will also have to play an active
role in implementing those social plans.216 Such social plans might
include providing laid off workers with new training, job-matching,
and unemployment resources.
German law, for example, defines collective redundancy as “dismissals
and other employer-induced ways of bringing an employment
relationship to its end.”217 Collective redundancy protections are
triggered if “an employer makes redundant: [1] 6 or more employees of
an establishment regularly employing 21–59 employees; [2] 10% or
more than 25 employees, of an establishment regularly employing 60–
499 employees; or [3] 30 or more employees of an establishment
regularly employing 500 or more employees.”218 If a German company
triggers a collective redundancy, the employer must consult with the
works council,219 an employee representation group mandated to exist
in some German firms.220 Together, the employer and the works
council develop a Reconciliation of Interests, which determines when
and how a lay-off will occur, as well as a Social Plan, which determines
the scope of compensation for terminated employees based on their
needs.221 German companies must only lay off employees who require
the least “social protection”: employees who have no family to provide
for, or who are young enough to seek other employment.222 One
example of a German Social Plan is the use of work-time accounts by
Bosch: “employees stock up on overtime pay when times are good, and
can then access that money when their hours get cut during a
215. Id.
216. Pieter de Koster & Felicity Gemson, Cross-Border Restructuring in Continental
Europe, PRACTICAL LAW UK ARTICLES 4 (2006) (noting that France, Germany,
Luxembourg, and Spain have mandatory social plans for employers).
217. Hengeler Mueller, Employment Law Newsletter No 5: Collective Redundancies in
Germany and the UK, 3 (2012), https://www.hengeler.com/fileadmin/news/BF_Letter
/05_CollectiveRedundancies_2012-11.PDF [https://perma.cc/4BDP-EY6H].
218. Id. at 4.
219. Annegret Müller-Mundt, Employees’ Rights on Redundancy in Germany, Global
Workplace Insider (Jun. 13, 2014), https://www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/2014
/06/employees-rights-on-redundancy-in-germany [https://perma.cc/WGW2-8GSZ].
220. Works councils are, generally, employee representation bodies embedded in the
corporate governance regime of a firm. Works Council, Germany, EUROFOUND (2020),
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/efemiredictionary/works-council-2
[https://perma.cc/425G-U2ZU].
221. María Caprile, Thematic Feature—Redundancies and Redundancy Costs, EUROFOUND
(2003).
222. Id.
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downturn.”223 Other examples are early retirement or buyout packages
for workers occupying positions a company wishes to eliminate. From the
German perspective, collective redundancy must be socially responsible.
Likewise, in France, employers must negotiate a social plan when there
are more than nine layoffs in a company of 50 or more employees.224 As
in Germany, the company may work with a works council, or it may
develop its own social plan.225 In addition to retirement and buyout
packages, French social plans contain “a catalog of measures” including
job retraining.226 Employers with more than 1,000 employees must offer
redeployment leave, job training, or job search programs.227 Employees
are required to take this redeployment leave during the statutory notice
period for the lay-off.228 Employees are paid regular wages when they
take the leave.229 While official sanction is not required by law for an
employer to lay off workers, it appears that in practice few, if any,
employers dare to lay off employees without public approval.230 In fact,
because the general welfare of workers has been rooted for so long in
the workplace, employers are also expected to provide laid-off
employees with some sort of severance payments and benefits.231
But Western European countries are not the only ones that mandate
some sort of consultation between employers, employees, and local
authorities before enacting layoffs. China, for example, formally
requires employers to notify the employee’s representatives before
laying off workers, solicit the union’s feedback on the layoffs, and

223. John Boitnott, Laying off Workers Doesn’t Have to Be Painful, INC. (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.inc.com/john-boitnott/laying-off-workers-doesnt-have-to-be-painfulthese-german-companies-show-how-to-do-it-more-humanely.html
[https://perma.cc/D8DH-RUFH].
224. France: Employers Obligation to Support Redundant Employees, EMCC EUROFOUND
(2019),
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/legislation/franceemployers-obligation-to-support-redundant-employees
[https://perma.cc/9VTNXXUJ].
225. Id.
226. David Hartmann, French Dismissal Procedure in France—Redundancy Plan in
France, ALARIS AVOCATS (May 31, 2019), https://www.alaris-law.com/french-dismissalprocedure-in-france-redundancy-plan-in-france [https://perma.cc/4F2V-CYKV].
227. France: Employers Obligation to Support Redundant Employees, supra note 224.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
EMPLOYMENT LAW 710–12 (2012).
231. Id. at 711.
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notify the local authorities by submitting a report to them.232 Scholars
have reported that employers in China seldom shut down operations
without receiving approval from the local authorities; the mass layoff
rules are, therefore, resilient, with its practice going beyond mere
reporting obligations.233
Of course, not all countries, including the United States, require
employers to conjure “social plans” with employees and government
authorities before enacting mass layoffs. Hence, here we also argue
that the ILO should adopt a convention on mass layoffs, with lead firms
in mind. Given the volatility of GVCs, and how restructurings might
leave large pockets of workers and communities bereft of economic
opportunities, countries need to legislate to deal with this problem at
the root of global capitalism. Workers and their communities not only
need and deserve protections in the case of mass layoffs, but lead firms,
which ultimately decide where to buy from, and at how much, should
also be held responsible for their decisions to find suppliers elsewhere
and abandon communities—perhaps even entire geographic locations.
While the ILO has a convention on employee termination, it does not
provide significant prescriptions on mass layoffs.234 The Termination of
Employment Convention, No. 158, mainly concerns the requirement
that employers provide cause and sufficient notice of termination to
employees, particularly in cases where employees are terminated due
to economic reasons. Further, the Convention requires that employers
provide notice to employee representatives and competent government
authorities upon employee termination. The Convention also engages
member states by requiring them to guarantee rights to unemployment
insurance, severance, pensions, and other similar payments to
workers.235 It does not deal, however, with any social plans to provide
workers and their communities with opportunities to find new
livelihoods, and perhaps re-link themselves to other GVCs. The ILO
232. Id. at 710–12; Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful
Dismissal Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 382 (2014)
(internal citations omitted); see Labor Law of 1994 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 27, 2010 (China),
available at https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/china.labor.law.1994/doc.html#86 [https://
perma.cc/B2NL-5MLU] (requiring that the employer “shall explain the situation to
its trade union or all of its employees 30 days in advance, solicit opinions from its trade
union or the employees, and report to the labor administrative department before it
makes such cuts”).
233. BLANPAIN, supra note 230, at 711.
234. Convention No. 158 Concerning Termination of Employment at Initiative of
the Employer, June 2, 1982, 1412 U.N.T.S. 160.
235. Id. at 164, 166, 168.
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should thus establish a convention that extends the social plan
programs to all countries, as they seem crucially important to resolve
the problems spurring from the so-called “forgotten man” dilemma.
If lead firms must participate in putting together social plans before
effecting mass layoffs, they may have to agree that local governments
monitor their implementation as it is typically prescribed in German,
French, and even Chinese law. The Convention may also provide that
central governments cooperate closely with municipal governments
toward effective implementation of such social plans. Given the
geographical disparities in value chain operation and dislocation
therefrom, as seen in U.S. Rust Belt cities, these “localized” social plans
sound even more plausible.236
At the same time, however, labor protection must be balanced with
competitiveness concerns. Note that GVC workers compete in global
markets, which means overly strict labor regulations could turn away
investors.237 Here, Denmark’s “flexicurity” model stands out as an ideal
policy balance between inclusion and competitiveness.238 Flexicurity
refers to Denmark’s “‘golden triangle’ of liberal job protection legislation,
generous income security, and active labor market programs.”239 However,
the idea of flexicurity is no longer merely Danish, as the European
Commission has welcomed the concept.240 This model allows firms to
hire and fire employees relatively freely, while requiring authorities to
provide generous unemployment benefits to mitigate sudden income
loss due to displacement.241
Additionally, effective flexicurity requires active labor market programs
that connect the unemployed to available jobs after retraining.242 The key
to Denmark’s success, i.e., conspicuously low levels of unemployment, is
the heavy investment from the government in active labor market
programs, a stark contrast to the United States minimal protection under
a petition-based “trade adjustment assistance” program that covers

236. WBG, supra note 5, at 203–04.
237. Id. at 202.
238. Thomas Bredgaard & Flemming Larsen, External and Internal Flexicurity:
Comparing Denmark and Japan, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 745, 746 (2010) (“The main
idea of the flexicurity concept is that flexibility and security are not contradictory but
mutually supportive.”).
239. Id. at 747.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 763–64 (describing the generous welfare policies in Denmark that soften
unemployment and mobility transitions).
242. WBG, supra note 5, at 202.
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income support and training.243 While developing countries might find it
difficult to adopt this model due to weak institutions and budgetary
constraints, such a model can help developed countries in avoiding
political backlash from trade liberalization.244 Below we also offer some
ideas on how to pay for such plans, namely through subsidies that meet
international trade rules.
D.

The WTO’s Advisory Role for the New ILO Conventions

We recognize that getting the ILO to adopt new conventions on lead
firm liability and mass layoffs will be politically difficult to execute.
Business leaders will likely oppose it, despite the Business Roundtable’s
recent declaration in favor of expanding corporate interests beyond
the narrow confines of the shareholder. True, the ILO has a tripartite
deliberative system that includes employer, worker, and government
input.245 Yet more general concerns on the overall impact that these
conventions exert on the global economy, and on global trade, might
not be completely appreciated or recognized by employers, workers,
and government as they worried more immediately about their
particular interests. Hence, we argue that the WTO should play an
active advisory role in crafting and implementing these new normative
products and practices to assuage those concerns.
For example, the WTO can certify that the ILO’s attempts to
regulate GVCs through new conventions on lead firm liability and mass
layoffs are legitimate under international trade law, such as under
GATT Article XX, and technical restrictions on trade rules.246 As such,
it can lend support to these new conventions because they will not
endanger global economic order upon which millions of people around
the globe depend for their subsistence.
The WTO can also advise on how global policies for social plans,
which will need changes in fiscal policies (to fund the plans) will not
create obstacles to world trade.
Finally, the WTO can lend the ILO and all labor and trade
stakeholders, including government officials, business representatives
and labor representatives, its “peer review” space. For the purpose of this
243. Id.; see also Getting Back to Work After a Trade Related Layoff, TRADE ADJUSTMENT
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2014), https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact
/docs/program_brochure2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7268-RT3Y].
244. WBG, supra note 5, at 202–03.
245. Tripartite Constituents, ILO (2020), https://www.ilo.org/global/about-theilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/7A34E7ED].
246. GATT, supra note 57, at art. XX.
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Article, peer review refers to a collective deliberative process of
evaluating a specific labor and trade concern among those stakeholders.
As we explain below, the peer review space can promote discussions
among stakeholders on how to more effectively link labor and trade
policy and build a post-populist, global economic order sensitive to
social concerns, while remaining vigilant of the various interests and
complexities involved in such a project. It can start the necessary global
conversation to make this new system real.
1.

Braiding global labor and trade rules with WTO advice
Suppose that a new ILO Convention on the Responsibility of Lead
Firms (the ILO Convention) endorses participating states to ban
products manufactured by those lead firms that have failed to fulfill
certain responsibilities (such as providing safe working conditions,
personal protective equipment, or paying overdue wages) as co- or
joint employers in conjunction with their contractors or suppliers. In a
provisional sense, such a ban could constitute a discriminatory measure
under GATT Article III:4247 or other trade restrictions under GATT
Article XI:1.248 Nonetheless, the WTO Secretariat may advise a regulating
state in compliance with the ILO Convention to refer to general
exceptions under GATT Article XX. Art. XX states:
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals . . .
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement . . .

247. GATT, supra note 57, at art. III:4 (“The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”).
248. Id. art. XI:1 (“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party.”).
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(e) relating to the products of prison labour . . . .249

Depending on the types of failures by lead firms, the regulating state
may justify its ban under paragraph (a), (d) or (e). Paragraph (a) of
Article XX provides the broadest avenue for justification. No matter
what duty a lead firm may fail to perform, as long as its failure
contradicts a general moral understanding of the regulating state, the
regulating state may ban products made by lead firms. As seen in both
Gambling250 and Seal251 case law, the WTO case law interprets the scope
of public morals rather broadly, affording wide discretion to the local
government.252 Also, suppose that the regulating state passes a domestic
statute in conformity with the ILO Convention and banned products
from particular lead firms under the statute. Under these circumstances,
the regulating state’s ban may be justified under paragraph (d). Finally,
if the regulating firm, as a joint employer, used any type of forced labor
or prison labor, paragraph (e) might offer another justification for a
ban.253
In addition to constituting public morals (paragraph (a)), WTOconsistent domestic laws or regulations (paragraph (d)) or prison
labor (paragraph (e)), a domestic labor policy implementing the ILO
Convention must meet the “necessary” or “relating to” test. Suppose
that the ILO Convention guides its signatories to ban a product
manufactured in a way that violates core labor standards. Also, suppose
that in compliance with the Convention a host country bans T-shirts
manufactured by a lead firm on the grounds that a contractor retained
by the lead firm failed to pay its workers minimum wages. Even though
a failure to pay workers minimum wage might violate public morals,
the regulating country must still prove that its ban was “necessary” to
protect public morals. For a ban to satisfy this necessity criterion, the
following factors must be weighed and balanced, as the WTO Appellate
Body has already pronounced:
249. Id. art. XX.
250. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).
251. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted on June 16,
2014).
252. See generally Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal
Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by
Noninstrumental Moral Values, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 413 (2012).
253. Elissa Alben, Note, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the LaborTrade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421–22 (2001) (proposing to expand the
concept of “prison labor” under GATT Article XX (e) to cover other forms of “forced
labor”).
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the relative importance of the common interests or values that the
law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect . . . the extent
to which the measure contributes to the realization of the end
pursued, the securing of compliance with the law or regulation at
issue . . . the extent to which the compliance measure produces
restrictive effects on international commerce . . . .254

This “weighing and balancing” process appears prudent, especially
considering that some scholars and policymakers question the efficacy
of linking labor standards and trade to achieve social goals. For
example, Professors Robert Stern and Katherine Terrell argue that,
“[a]lternative policies and existing institutions must be deployed to ensure that:
(a) workers in industrialized countries will not be adversely affected by
freer trade and globalization in general; and (b) wages and working
conditions of workers in the developing countries can be improved at a
sustainable pace.255
True, the public morals exception might be abused by some
countries to ban products from particular lead firms and suppliers,
contractors, and franchisees, for a protectionist purpose. In that case,
the WTO Secretariat may advise an exporting country (a country to
which those lead firms belong to) to refer to the introductory language
of Article XX, which states in relevant part that, inter alia, the public
morals exception is “[s]ubject to the requirement that [it is] not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade.”256 The home country of
the lead firm may use that important proviso to ward off a protectionist
ban that violated international trade law.
Another vehicle that both a regulating country and an exporting
country may rely on to defend or challenge a ban is the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade.257 First of all, a ban adopted and
implemented in accordance with the ILO conventions would constitute
254. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 162–63 WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001).
255. Robert M. Stern & Katherine Terrell, Labor Standards and the World Trade
Organization: A Position Paper, 2 (Res. Seminar in Int’l Econ., U. of Mich., Working
Paper No. 499, 2003) (emphasis added), http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/
workingpapers/Papers476-500/r499.pdf.
256. GATT, supra note 57, at art. XX (“Subject to the requirement that [it is] not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.”).
257. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 1186 U.N.T.S. 286.
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a “technical regulation” under the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement as it “lays down characteristics of a product such as levels
of quality, performance, safety or dimensions.”.258 Then, Article 2
provides certain conditions under which technical regulation may be
justified. As it states:
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by
Central Government Bodies
With respect to their central government bodies: . . .
2.2 Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose,
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia:
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices;
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health,
or the environment.259

The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement provides an open list of
“legitimate” objectives which may include those concerns under the
ILO Convention. As long as the aforementioned ban, qua “technical
regulation” under the Technical Barriers to Trade, does not constitute
“unnecessary obstacles,” the WTO Secretariat may advise the regulating
state to rely on Article 2.2.
2.

Fiscal policies that further global labor and trade, but not protectionism
As discussed above, the ILO conventions may encourage participating
states to adopt fiscal measures, such as a tax break, to incentivize lead
firms to set up social plans in times of mass layoffs or collective
redundancies. Governments may reward lead firms through tax incentives
when they provide training and skill development opportunities as part of
a social plan.260 According to the International Monetary Fund, if a host
country exempts the labor portion of value added from taxation, it will
encourage lead firms to create jobs within the host country, while
discouraging them to pursue tax avoidance.261 Such fiscal measures
could be a “win-win-win” to the three parties involved. While
258. Id. Annex 1.
259. Id. art. 2.2.
260. See Dennis J. Snower, Toward Human-Centered Capitalism: Exploring a New Social
Contract, GLOBAL ECON. & DEV. BRIEF, BROOKINGS (2019) (discussing the new social
contract where taxes finance “employment and training incentives”).
261. IMF, Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy, IMF Policy Paper 2, 26 (Mar.
2019).
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governments relax fiscal rules, they may also attract more investment
from lead firms into that country, which will help them deliver
economic prosperity to their countries. Lead firms will save money
because of the tax break, giving it an opportunity to fund social plans
that might improve employee morale (if employees know the benefit
exists, in the case of layoffs). The social reputation of the firm gets a
boost.262 Workers get better job security.
In this regard, Malaysia’s “Industrial Linkages Program” (ILP) is a
case in point.263 The ILP was created in 1996 to offer fiscal incentives
to both multinational lead firms and local small and medium
enterprises (“SMEs”). It matches a lead firm that seeks preferential
access to industrial sites with a local SME that seeks financing for skills
development. To be eligible for the program, a Malaysian SME must,
among other things, supply at least one multinational lead firm a
product on the “List of Promoted Activities and Products.”264 Once
accepted, in addition to receiving various tax incentives on income and
investment tax, those SMEs are offered “matching services” through
Malaysia’s SME agency (SME Corporation Malaysia) that facilitate
worker training in partnership with an interested lead firm.265
However, if the lead firm receiving tax breaks belongs to the subsidyproviding country, it may be seen as market-distorting state support. In
other words, in the name of complying with the ILO conventions,
governments might be tempted to provide their domestic lead firms
with unfair competitive advantages in the form of tax breaks. Here, the
WTO may monitor whether those subsidies are truly for promoting the
social welfare of workers or a disguised form of protectionism. For
example, the WTO Secretariat could advise the subsidizing country to
ensure that its subsidies are consistent with the WTO subsidy rules. Under
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,266 a
subsidy must be broad (“non-specific”) enough not to target any
particular company or industry. Article 2 of the Agreement provides:
262. Admittedly, reputation effects might only be relevant for lead firms with brand
name recognition. See id. at 49, 55 (highlighting the uniqueness of intangibles like
brand names and the difficulty of applying an arm’s length pricing scheme for valuing
a transaction).
263. WBG, supra note 5, at 178; see also SME Development, MALAY. MINISTRY OF INT’L
TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
https://www.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/1801
[https://perma.cc/7KT9-88HZ].
264. WBG, supra note 5, at 178.
265. Id.
266. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 22417 U.N.T.S.
22420.
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Specificity
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy . . . is specific to an
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries . . . , the
following principles shall apply:
(a) Where the granting authority . . . explicitly limits access to a
subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific.
...
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity . . . , there
are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other
factors may be considered. Such factors are: use of a subsidy
programme by a limited number of certain enterprises,
predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of
disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises,
and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the
granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.267

In accordance with these specificity conditions, the WTO Secretariat
may consult a granting authority in establishing the WTO-consistent
eligibility criteria for lead firms in receiving tax breaks in return for
funding social plans. In reality, the de facto specificity requirement
under paragraph (c) of Article 2.1 appears to be most controversial.
Given the limited number of lead firms big enough to afford
contributions to social plans, tax breaks by a given granting authority
may be concentrated on a handful of firms. This concentration would
in turn result in “disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain
enterprises.”268 Nonetheless, to the extent that the subsidizing government
provides tax breaks in return for contribution to social plans, its
subsidization may still be justified in a way which inoculates the de facto
specificity. Moreover, insofar as tax breaks benefit the employment
situation within the territory of the granting authority, one can say that
these subsidies also contribute to the “diversification of economic activities”
within that territory.
3. Bringing together labor and trade policymakers and stakeholders through
the WTO’s peer review space
Adopting and enforcing the ILO conventions that we advocate for
here may result in controversy. In fact, they might even precipitate
trade disputes. As discussed above, certain exporting countries, in
particular those from which lead firms originate, may complain that a
regulating country’s regulations on their lead firms runs afoul of WTO

267. Id. art. 2.1.
268. Id.

1818

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1771

norms, even if they are in compliance with the ILO conventions.
Granted, the WTO Secretariat’s advice on the aforementioned
regulatory and fiscal dimension may mitigate exporting countries’
concerns. However, it may not prevent an exporting country from
raising disputes. And while disputes will be eventually resolved through
the WTO dispute settlement system, the politically sensitive nature of
these disputes risks escalating tensions between a complaining party
and a defending party, regardless of the final decision declared by the
WTO. In this way, dispute prevention via “peer review” might more
desirable than dispute resolution.269 As seen in the Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) Committee and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Committee, such peer review has been quite successful under the WTO
system.270
The peer review mechanism is, in essence, an informal space that
member countries of the WTO can use to resolve disputes, and perhaps
even persuade each other of their positions, or even develop new trade
practices and norms. As the WTO explains:
The [peer] reviews focus on members’ own trade policies and
practices. But they also take into account the countries’ wider
economic and developmental needs, their policies and objectives,
and the external economic environment that they face. These “peer
reviews” by other WTO members encourage governments to follow
more closely the WTO rules and disciplines and to fulfil their
commitments. In practice the reviews have two broad results: they
enable outsiders to understand a country’s policies and circumstances,
and they provide feedback to the reviewed country on its performance
in the system.271

In this light, the WTO could commission a peer review mechanism
to resolve trade and labor disputes or develop norms, including those
for the ILO conventions advocated for in this Article. This trade-labor
peer review can be commissioned under the banner of what we could
call a “Joint Labor and Trade Committee” co-organized by the ILO and
the WTO. Under the new tripartite framework of interagency
collaboration, the Joint Committee would invite government, business
269. See Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 887–89
(2003) (arguing that the WTO adversarial system is ill-suited to resolve labor concerns
and advocating for WTO reforms so that stakeholders can openly and transparently
negotiate labor and trade disputes).
270. See Sungjoon Cho, How the World Trade Community Operates: Norms and Discourse,
13 WORLD TRADE REV. 685, 705 (2014) (arguing that peer review tends to avoid the
adversarial nature of adjudication) [hereinafter Norms and Discourse].
271. Trade Policy Reviews: Ensuring Transparency, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm [https://perma.cc/53RQ-SLKD].
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(lead firms, their suppliers, contractors, and franchisees), and labor
representatives to a space where they can discuss specific labor-trade
concerns originating from any regulatory concerns that may stem from
the ILO conventions described here. While parties advance and defend
their own positions in these peer reviews, they are expected to raise
awareness, and understanding, of others’ positions, which can increase
the level of understanding toward each other.272 Considering a
multijurisdictional nature of GVCs, this Joint Committee may be
uniquely positioned to address an equally multijurisdictional grievance
that may be prompted by the implementation of the new ILO
conventions.273
The operational logic of the Joint Committee would thus be “learning,
perspective taking, mutual persuasion, and eventually the development of
non-binary regulatory solutions.”274 While repeated peer review may not
resolve the given grievance completely, it may still manage it in a way
that effectively eases tensions.275
Hence, our proposal to activate peer review as a collaborative space
for the ILO, the WTO, and the relevant stakeholders, resembles
Professor Andrew Guzman’s call for an open, transparent, and
deliberative space within the WTO to negotiate labor and trade disputes
and anchor new norms and practices.276 The difference between
Guzman’s proposal and ours is that Guzman calls for formal reforms
of the WTO structure, while ours informally incorporates the ILO into
the existing peer review framework of the WTO. In other words, rather
than trying to formally change the WTO, we argue that the ILO and
272. Norms and Discourse, supra note 270, at 709 (viewing that diurnal regulatory
dialogue, if repeated, tends to incrementally broaden shared grounds among
regulators from different countries and thus facilitate mutual understanding on each
other’s unique regulatory challenges).
273. An “impact analysis” may facilitate the peer review process. The ILO and the
WTO Secretariat may provide a labor impact analysis and a trade impact analysis,
respectively. While the ILO Secretariat may articulate impacts of social upgrading
through the implementation of the ILO conventions, the WTO Secretariat may assess
any significant negative impact to trade, including any change in the volume of trade
in the most vulnerable industrial sectors. Some national governments adopt similar
trade impact assessments (TIAs) in carrying out various regulations. See e.g., Guidance
Note: Trade Impact Assessments Austl. Dep’t of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Off. of
Best Practice Reg. (2016), https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications
/trade_impact_qssessments.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6WK-Z25M].
274. Sungjoon Cho et al., Communitizing Transnational Regulatory Concerns, 18 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 48, 52 (2017).
275. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 245–46 (1995).
276. Guzman, supra note 269, at 888–89.
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the WTO should informally collaborate. The ILO’s tripartite groups
should enter the existing peer review framework of the WTO to discuss
and deliberate the norms and practices that could best regulate GVCs.
In this sense, our proposal requires no formal organizational changes,
which are always much harder to affect. It does require a political will
to collaborate and start a conversation among all the stakeholders on
how to better regulate GVCs.
CONCLUSION
We live in world aflame, both figuratively and in reality. The 2019–
20 California, Brazil, and Australia wildfires, traced to climate change,
itself a product of ill-restrained markets and global capitalism,277
matched the populist tide engulfing rich and poor states alike, putting
serious strains on the global economic order. Even the countries
perceived as “winning” from global trade, such as China and Bangladesh,
suffer from sinister industrial accidents and worse-than-poor working
conditions that violate basic international labor standards.278 The recent
episode of striking workers in Ciudad Juarez, compelled to work
during the COVID-19 pandemic, without proper safety measures, and
without really being essential, due to U.S. lead firm and government
pressures is also on point.279 This Article proposes that a post-populist
era requires a shift in the global economic order: an ILO-WTO
collaboration to develop new ILO conventions on lead firm liability
277. See Jeff Sparrow, Australia’s Fires Give Us a Glimpse of What’s Coming, JACOBIN,
https://jacobinmag.com/2020/01/australia-bushfires-climate-change-new-southwales-scott-morrison [https://perma.cc/6DF7-DVFH] (Jan. 3, 2020) (describing how
pro-fossil fuel policies are partly to blame for the magnitude of the Australian
wildfires); see also Meg Kelly & Sarah Cahlan, The Brazilian Amazon Is Still Burning. Who
Is Responsible?, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/10/07/brazilian-amazon-is-still-burning-who-is-responsible
[https://perma.cc/PY5L-CFYB]; John W. Schoen & Jordan McDonald, Warming
Climate, Population Sprawl Threaten California’s Future with More Destructive Wildfires,
CNBC (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/09/why-californias-wildfiresare-going-to-get-worse.html [https://perma.cc/94F6-2X2X].
278. See Elizabeth Paton, After Factory Disaster, Bangladesh Made Big Safety Strides. Are
the Bad Days Coming Back?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/03/01/world/asia/rana-plaza-bangladesh-garment-industry.html
[https://perma.cc/W4E3-5DLU] (highlighting recent changes to labor protections in
Bangladesh).
279. Lauren Villagran & Veronica Martinez Jacobo, ‘Better Dead than Fired?’ Juarez
Workers Strike as US Plants Fight to Stay Open Amid COVID-19, EL PASO TIMES (Apr. 23,
2020), https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2020/04/23/coronavirus-juarezfactory-workers-electrical-components-international-strike-covid-19/5165842002
[https://perma.cc/MM72-ML7K].
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and mass layoffs. As the aegis of global trade and much of our global
economy, GVCs structure economic opportunities and the life chances
of millions of people around the globe. Yet, the indirect, contractual
manner in which lead firms control their suppliers, contractors, and
franchisees helps lead firms largely escape effective regulation, as many
researchers and international organizations have shown, and as
reported in this Article.
Moreover, the transnational character of GVCs and the ossified
nation-state-based system of regulation, as we have argued here,
further contributes to the existing GVC regulatory gap. This regulatory
gap must be filled. The ILO, as the international organization with the
mandate and know-how to regulate global labor needs to enact new
conventions that extend employer liabilities to lead firms. And to
better guarantee that lead firms will be, in fact, responsible for shocks
that their relocation decisions may bring on entire communities, the
ILO should also establish a new convention on mass layoffs where
employers, including lead firms, negotiate social plans with workers
and local authorities. These social plans should help affected parties
retool and re-link themselves to other GVC actors and, thus, no longer
be “forgotten.”
Perhaps the more controversial, but also more innovative idea that
this Article proposes, is that the WTO should also get involved in
structuring the post-populist order. It can provide legitimacy to the
ILO conventions proposed here by showing how they can be sustained
by Article XX of GATT and Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade. It can also provide advice on how to
establish fiscal policies that would promote pro-worker global norms
without crossing the line into trade protectionism. Moreover, the WTO
can structure an arena of dialogue between labor and trade
policymakers and stakeholders, via its peer review function, to further
relationships that align global labor and trade communities in a postpopulist project.
Skeptics might argue, following the lead of the Singapore
Declaration, that trade and labor are separate areas of regulation and
their formal linkage is unwarranted. However, the joint reports by the
organizations reviewed here show that trade and labor are empirically
connected. Moreover, the populist backlash against globalism also
shows that labor concerns lie at the center of international trade. We
cannot hide the sun with our hand. Deeper formal labor-trade linkage
is what the global economic system needs.
Others might argue that our approach here to resolve the challenges
of populism are, simply, just not enough. International law is too
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politically dependent, vague, and non-binding, i.e., “soft,” to have any
efficacy over the social conditions of workers. Professor Sergio
Gamonal, for example, has argued that soft law approaches to workers’
rights in free trade agreements are doomed to failure because the
labor provisions in the trade agreements are apt to mean nothing
unless violators can suffer trade sanctions.280 Other scholars, mostly
stemming from the rational choice school, argue that international law
is created by states acting in their own self-interest, and not by higherordered norms or values established in international law texts.281 Hence,
one could presume that unless those rational actors can be materially
deterred, ILO conventions and dialogue between stakeholders
coordinated by the WTO would be dominated by the stronger parties—
states with large economies, where lead firms reside, and perhaps even
the very lead firms that the policymakers attempt to regulate.
While we agree that new ILO conventions and dialogue between the
various labor and trade stakeholders will not lead to immediately
palpable transformations in global inequality and workers’ rights, our
proposal aims to start a process toward a post-populist system where lead
firms finally start taking on responsibility for their actions. We expect
that, eventually, states will legislate enforceable rules to regulate GVCs,
and lead firms specifically. But we cannot create this new post-populist
era from thin air, or simply legislate for it (even if there was such a
thing as a world legislature). There are policymakers and stakeholders
who disagree about the benefits of a global economic system that
imposes employer liabilities on lead firms. Policymakers and
stakeholders thus need a space where they can engage in a muchneeded conversation for a regulatory project. As Professor Sungjoon Cho
has already argued in prior work, “a calm, modest yet incrementally
effective approach to linkage, using soft law and cooperative networking”
is what the times require.282
And as to the critics that international law is not law at all, and cannot
really affect governments, employers, and workers around the world,
well, that claim is simply not true. Scholars have noted that the ILO
has had an enduring effect on the labor laws of many countries, and

280. Sergio Gamonal, Labour Obligations in the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement: The
Illusion of Soft Law 27 4 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & IND. REL. 407, 415–16 (2011).
281. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4,
6, 84 (2005) (discussing the rational choice theory and states’ interests when acting as
parties to treaties).
282. Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the
Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 669 (2005).
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for many years.283 Professor James Brudney has shown, for example,
that countries around the world have incorporated ILO standards on
child labor, freedom of association, and collective bargaining through
two mechanisms: the ratification of ILO conventions, and the inclusion
of ILO standards in free trade agreements.284 While changes in national
laws have not been immediate, they have been “evolutionary.”285
Hence why we argue that the ILO’s tripartite system is an excellent
place to start a process to regulate GVCs. But in order to further ease
anxieties over the impact of ILO rules over the trade regime, we also
propose that the WTO advise the ILO on how WTO norms on public
morals and rules on subsidies might help support the new ILO
conventions. Finally, the WTO’s peer review space would offer labor
and trade stakeholders another space to broaden their deliberations
beyond the more structured International Labor Conference of the
ILO. In other words, while we clearly argue for a post-populist order,
the policies to get there still require discussion. A joint ILO and WTO
project can help propel a process towards that post-populist goal.
Like international law skeptics, others might argue that the United
States, a major base of lead firms, and certainly a host of many other
GVC actors, seldom pays attention to international law. The U.S.
Congress and the Supreme Court have openly declared in various
occasions the exceptional character of the United States, justifying its
non-adherence to international law.286 In fact, some important
Supreme Court justices have even been hostile to the influence of
international law.287 Therefore, the role that the ILO and the WTO
may have on its trade practices and labor protections will be close to
negligible.
Again, we disagree. While it is true that the United States pays scant
attention to a lot of international law, it remains true that international
283. See Juan Manuel Palacio, From Social Legislation to Labor Justice: The Common
Background in the Americas, in LABOR JUSTICE ACROSS THE AMERICAS 35–37 (Leon Fink &
Juan Manuel Palacio eds., 2018) (describing the role of the ILO in the Americas as
creating “the building blocks of the ‘labor question’ in the Americas”); James J.
Brudney, The Internationalization of Sources of Labor Law, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15, 39
(2018) (showing the influence of the ILO in U.S. Trade Agreements and domestic
labor laws in the Americas).
284. Brudney, supra note 283, at 5–6.
285. Id. at 6.
286. Id. at 7 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) and AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1–3 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005)).
287. Former Justice Antonin Scalia suggested in his dissent of Roper v. Simmons that
“foreign and international law have no place in our . . . jurisprudence.” 543 U.S. 551,
604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (2005) (referencing Justice Scalia’s opinion).
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law plays a central part in the law of many countries and, in this fashion,
new ILO conventions done in collaboration with the WTO will likely
have important impacts around the world. Moreover, to the extent
large countries and regions, such as the European Union and China,
adopt these rules for lead firms and mass layoffs, U.S. lead firms will be
subject to liabilities for their activities in the European Union and
China. The United States may have to respond in similar kind and
extend employer liability to foreign lead firms in the United States,
including liabilities for mass layoffs, to give American workers similar
access to the deep pockets of foreign lead firms. In other words, as lead
firm liabilities and social plans diffuse globally, U.S. law might have to
mimic those rules for the sake of U.S. businesses and workers alike.
Moreover, we should not forget that while the United States
sometimes inoculates itself from international law, it typically
contributes to new international norms and expects that other
countries will abide with international law. As Professor James Brudney
has shown, the United States has included ILO standards in the labor
provisions of its free trade agreements with other countries.288 U.S.
trading partners have sometimes changed their domestic laws in order
to comply with these labor clauses insisted upon by the United States.289
In other words, there is a chance that lead firm liability might be
diffused by the United States through trade agreements even if, at least
initially, the United States does not apply those standards to itself.
Additionally, critics of our proposal might argue that a convention
on mass layoffs where lead firms will have to negotiate social plans with
local authorities and worker representatives will put developing
countries and poor workers at a competitive disadvantage, since a way
they attract investment is through lower labor costs.290 It would be
disastrous for countries such as Malawi and Cambodia, for example, to
copy the rules of highly advanced countries such as Germany and
Denmark. Social plans increase labor costs and the developing world
is just not ready for them.
We have several rebuttals to this argument. First, we must
underscore that mass layoff rules exist in a variety of countries, not just
in Europe. As we describe here, China has rules that require employers
to produce a report for the local authorities and notify worker
representatives before effecting a partial or complete shutdown of

288. Brudney, supra note 283, at 38–39.
289. Id. at 39–40.
290. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126,
131, 133–34 (2002).
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operations. Second, our proposal suggests that countries provide lead
firms with subsidies to help defray the costs of social plans, policies that
could be coordinated with the WTO to guarantee they are not trade
protectionist. Third, social plans are generally negotiated with local
authorities. Therefore, local authorities, under our proposal, will
retain sufficient space and authority to set the terms of social plans.
They can help produce plans that can sufficiently help affected
workers without unduly scaring away investors. Finally, this Article has
explained that the goal of all GVC actors should be to upgrade in
supply chains, produce more complex goods and services and hence
improve their relative economic positions. As we have also argued
here, economic upgrading will not happen without social upgrading.
Rules for mass layoffs are an important step towards helping workers,
and perhaps even contractors, suppliers, and franchisees abandoned
by some lead firms, to retool and re-link themselves to supply chains.
Rules for mass layoffs should thus be seen as important investment in
the future of countries.
Finally, other critics might argue that giving the WTO any space to
influence the ILO would lead to a colonization of the ILO by the WTO,
a hegemonic actor that strongly favors businesses over workers. We do
not believe that the WTO must necessarily unduly influence the ILO.
First, the WTO is in a current period of crisis, as we reported here, not
least due to the populist wave. If the WTO does not take social
concerns seriously, its downward trajectory will continue. In fact, we
doubt that the WTO has the resources or even status to colonize the
ILO in any meaningful way, given that the ILO’s structure incorporates
member states, labor representatives, and employer representatives
who do not necessarily see eye-to-eye with the WTO and will thus guard
their interests.
In all, we believe that ILO and WTO collaboration is a project worth
the effort to contribute to a post-populist, global economic system that
is sensitive to social concerns, while providing a space for the complex
web of labor and trade stakeholders to deliberate and develop that
order. ILO-WTO collaboration will not solve all our current challenges
but can help to pave the way out of our current global political crisis.
A post-populist global order is possible. We have the existing
institutional materials to start a process to give it form. The ingredient
we now need is political will.

